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Contemporary academic research and scholarship are highly specialized. 
Legal scholarship on arbitration reflects this trend. There is extensive literature 
on domestic arbitration jurisprudence, on international commercial arbitration 
practice, and on investor-state arbitration procedure, and there are debates 
about the appropriate use of arbitration within all of these domains. But few of 
the participants in these debates are attentive to developments outside their own 
domains, and there are few examples of scholarship surveying trends across the 
three domains. Undertaking that analysis reveals important similarities in the 
challenges facing arbitration in each domain and in the responses to these chal-
lenges. Looking across all three domains—domestic arbitration within the United 
States, international commercial arbitration, and investor-state arbitration—we 
observe an expanding application of arbitration beyond purely private disputes to 
disputes with significant public policy dimensions. In response, there is increas-
ing pressure in all three domains to incorporate in arbitration measures tradi-
tionally associated with public courts, including due process protections, public 
appointment of adjudicators, and process and outcome transparency. The result 
is a new form of dispute resolution, neither wholly private nor fully public, and 
satisfying neither those who promote the virtues of private dispute resolution nor 
those who insist that public courts are the proper locus for disputes with im-
portant public policy implications. We argue that re-inventing arbitration to ad-
here to public justice norms risks undermining its value for private actors with 
private disputes, while at the same time undermining courts as institutions for 
public contest over public policy issues. Rather than adding the trappings of pub-
lic adjudication to arbitration, we should re-think the scope of arbitration in do-
mestic and international spheres. 
                                                        
*  Judge John W. Ford Professor of Dispute Resolution, Stanford Law School. This article 
was initially prepared for a public lecture at the Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution at 
the University of Nevada Law School. I am grateful to Jean Sternlight for first proposing this 
lecture and to her and attendees at the lecture for their comments. Unfortunately, due to the 
constraints of the publication schedule, I was not able to benefit from the insights of the au-
thors who responded to this paper.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary academic research and scholarship are highly specialized. 
Legal scholarship on arbitration reflects this trend. There is extensive literature 
on domestic arbitration jurisprudence, on international commercial arbitration 
practice, and on investor-state arbitration procedure, but few examples of 
scholarship surveying trends across domains.1 Law schools offer separate 
                                                        
1  Recent dispute resolution scholarship has begun to cross national boundaries but not the 
three arbitration domains that are the subject of this article. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Diffus-
ing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure 
of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2930–31 (2015) (focusing mainly on U.S. developments but 
incorporating references to EU law and policy). Some authors caution against inferring any-
thing about developments in one domain from observations of developments in another. See, 
e.g., Rémy Gerbay, Is the End Nigh Again? An Empirical Assessment of the “Judicializa-
tion” of International Arbitration, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 223 n.3 (2014) (arguing that 
“there are different dynamics at play internationally and domestically, which render domes-
tic and international arbitration difficult to compare.”). 
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courses on arbitration in domestic and international spheres, and casebooks for 
instructional use reflect this divide.2 
Within each of these arbitration domains—domestic, international com-
mercial, and international investment—there are disputes about arbitration pol-
icy and practice. Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions upholding the use of 
mandatory arbitration clauses to preclude class actions3 have evoked a storm of 
controversy4 and led to legislative and regulatory efforts to outlaw such claus-
                                                        
2  See, e.g., THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 2012) (summary 
of U.S. law with a section on international commercial arbitration); THOMAS E. 
CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE (7th ed. 2015) 
(focusing on U.S. law with particular attention to recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
but including a section on international commercial arbitration); CHRISTOPHER R. 
DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS (3d ed. 2013) (focusing on 
U.S. domestic arbitration but including two chapters on enforcing international arbitration 
agreements and international arbitration awards); PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (2013) (U.S. constitutional framework for arbitration); KATHERINE V.W. 
STONE ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW (3d ed. 2015) (focusing on U.S. law regarding arbitration 
with additional material on court-connected non-binding arbitration). For discussion on the 
international use of arbitration, see, for example, GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: CASE AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2015) (focusing on international arbitration, but 
including a section on “supportive” national law in the United States, England, France and 
Switzerland and selected materials on investor-state arbitration); GARY B. BORN, 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2016) (summary of material cov-
ered in casebook, including a chapter on investor-state arbitration); GARY B. BORN, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2014) (This three-volume set is widely 
regarded as the leading reference on international commercial arbitration. As described by its 
author, “[t]he treatise’s focus is expressly international, focusing on how both developed and 
other jurisdictions around the world give effect to . . . [international agreements]. . . . Every 
effort is made to avoid adopting purely national solutions, without consideration of interna-
tional and comparative perspectives.”) Id. at 5. Born’s treatment of international commercial 
arbitration is openly celebrated. See generally TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. 
Naimark eds., 2005). As the use of investor-state arbitration has grown, specialized volumes 
on that form of arbitration have also emerged. See, e.g., CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES (2d ed. 2017); NOAH 
RUBINS & BEN LOVE, PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (forthcoming 
June 2018); J. ROMESH WEERAMANTRY, TREATY INTERPRETATION IN INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION (2012). But see THOMAS HALE, BETWEEN INTERESTS AND LAW: THE POLITICS 
OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2015) (placing the evolution of arbitration law 
in the framework of international politics and governance). 
3  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (upholding consumer con-
tract clause precluding subscribers from proceeding against the defendant in collective 
form); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 (2013) (upholding 
commercial contract precluding small business from proceeding against the defendant in col-
lective form notwithstanding likelihood that this will deny vindication of rights). 
4  See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, How Italian Colors Guts Private Antitrust Enforcement by Re-
placing it with Ineffective Forms of Arbitration, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 771, 771 (2015); J. 
Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 
3052, 3091–92 (2015). 
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es.5 Earlier U.S. Supreme Court decisions extending arbitration to statutory 
claims, including civil rights claims,6 were similarly controversial.7 
Controversy in the international commercial arbitration domain focuses on 
practice rather than on jurisprudence. Early critics of business-to-business 
commercial arbitration targeted outcomes more than process, as business dispu-
tants and their lawyers complained that arbitrators often “split the baby”—i.e. 
delivered compromise awards—rather than applying decisional rules based on 
law or industry norms.8 But recent criticism focuses on the increasing time and 
expense of arbitration (both in domestic and international domains) as parties 
have imported American-style discovery, including voluminous document ex-
change, interrogatories, and depositions9 into what was traditionally envisioned 
                                                        
5  See Sylvan Lane, House Votes to Repeal Consumer Arbitration Rule, HILL (July 25, 2017, 
5:09 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/343652-house-votes-to-repeal-consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-rule [https://perma.cc/SD2D-YFUT] A companion Senate meas-
ure was briefly derailed by controversy over a massive security breach at Equifax. See Aída 
Chávez et al., After Equifax Breach, GOP Senators Don’t Yet Have Votes to Overturn Criti-
cal Rule That Protects Consumers, INTERCEPT (Sept. 28, 2017, 1:58 PM), 
https://theintercept.com/2017/09/28/republicans-equifax-consumer-protection rule/ 
[https://perma.cc/98EL-3D2S]. On Nov. 1, 2017, the President signed a joint resolution 
passed by Congress disapproving the Arbitration Agreements Rule under the Congressional 
Review Act (CRA). Pursuant to the joint resolution, the Arbitration Agreements Rule no 
longer has force or effect. On Nov. 22, 2017, the Bureau published a notice removing the 
Arbitration Agreements Rule from the Code of Federal Regulations. The materials relating 
to the Arbitration Agreements Rule on the Bureau’s website are for reference only.  
6  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630–31 (1985) 
(holding that the defendant’s antitrust claims were arbitrable); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (holding that claims under RICO and the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 can be arbitrated); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 
20, 35 (1991) (holding that claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
are arbitrable). 
7  See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Compelling Arbitration of Claims Under the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866: What Congress Could Not Have Intended, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 273, 281 (1999); 
Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 
1632 (2005) [hereinafter Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration]; Katherine Van Wezel 
Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of 
the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1996). 
8  See, e.g., Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not “Split the Baby”: 
Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitrations, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 573 (2001) 
(citing assertions that such behavior exists and presenting empirical evidence from a small 
sample of international commercial arbitration awards that contravenes the perception); 
DOUGLAS SHONTZ ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS 
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 11 (2011), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR781.html [https://perma.cc/5KRT-M49V]. 
9  As discussed infra Sections II.C, III.B, parties and lawyers often describe the process of 
arbitration with extensive discovery and more formalized procedures as the “judicialization” 
of arbitration. See, e.g., Gerbay, supra note 1, at 224. Note, however, that Gerbay finds that 
empirical evidence does not support the claim of “judicialization” of international commer-
cial arbitration. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
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as a streamlined presentation of evidence followed by swift decision-making.10 
Available data suggest that the increase in procedural complexity can be linked 
to an increase in the fraction of disputes referred to arbitration that are com-
plex: disputes involving more than two parties, high financial stakes, and com-
plicated facts and law.11 Whereas disputes resulting from routine cross-border 
trading were once the staples of international commercial arbitration, now 
many arbitrated disputes arise out of activities in heavily regulated industries, 
including energy, telecommunications, and information technology,12 involving 
additional layers of complexity. 
Like the controversies that have arisen over the past several decades re-
garding domestic arbitration in the United States, controversy regarding inves-
tor-state arbitration is chiefly about policy. As discussed infra, investor-state 
arbitration was designed to provide an alternative for foreign investors to bring 
suit against a sovereign nation in that nation’s domestic courts when the sover-
eign entity allegedly breached a contract.13 However, critics argue that increas-
ingly multi-national corporations are using the procedure to challenge demo-
cratically-adopted health, safety, and environmental protection regulations.14 
Procedure is central to the debate over investor-state arbitration not because of 
concern about time and expense (as with regard to international commercial ar-
bitration), but rather because critics view it as illegitimate for public policy dis-
putes to be decided behind closed doors by private individuals who are private-
ly paid.15 Controversy over investor-state arbitration heated up in the past 
several years as national trade representatives were negotiating multilateral 
trade agreements (e.g. the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and the 
Trans-Atlantic Investment and Partnership Agreement) that included clauses 
                                                        
10  See, e.g., Karen Willcutts, Arbitration: Still an Effective Method of Resolving Business 
Disputes?, DALL. B. ASS’N (Mar. 3, 2016, 4:37 PM), http://www.dallasbar.org/book-
page/arbitration-still-effective-method-resolving-business-disputes [https://perma.cc/TC5N-
L72F] (advising arbitration counsel to negotiate with in-house counsel to adapt arbitration 
clauses intended for simple transactions in order to meet the needs of complex disputes for 
scheduling orders, agreements regarding production of documents, limits on dispositive or-
ders and sophisticated briefing). 
11  Gerbay, supra note 1, at 241–44. Gerbay’s analysis relies on two decades of caseload data 
from the International Chamber of Commerce, a leading provider of international commer-
cial arbitration. 
12  Id. at 240 n.83. 
13  See infra Section III.A. 
14  LISE JOHNSON ET AL., COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT, PUBLIC INTEREST AND U.S. DOMESTIC LAW 1 (2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/fi 
les/2015/05/Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Public-Interest-and-U.S.-Domestic-Law-
FINAL-May-19-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/L78Y-UQR7]. 
15  Id. at 3. “ISDS provides significant substantive and procedural rights to individuals and 
corporations based solely on their foreign nationality, and outsources development and inter-
pretation of law to private arbitrators insulated from crucial checks and balances. Through 
this grant of rights and transfer of lawmaking power, ISDS threatens to undermine legal sys-
tems and policymaking at the domestic level.” Id. “ISDS” is a catch-all phrase used to refer 
collectively to different investor-state arbitration protocols and procedures: 
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mandating that disputes that arose under the treaties would be resolved via in-
vestor-state arbitration.16 
Controversies within each of the three domains reflect different historical 
circumstances and political dynamics. However, a common cause of controver-
sy is the expansion of the scope of arbitration in each domain to disputes for 
which the procedure arguably was not originally intended, particularly disputes 
with significant public policy dimensions. The most frequent response to criti-
cism of this expansion in each domain has been to adapt arbitration procedures 
to resemble more closely public adjudicative procedures: to strengthen due pro-
cess by relying more heavily on documentary evidence and live witness testi-
mony and by requiring reasoned decisions, and to de-privatize the process by 
publishing arbitration awards, and (in the case of investor-state arbitration) to 
open up the process to third-parties, including inviting amicus briefs.17 
In the United States, to shore up the legitimacy of arbitrations that result 
from form contracts (i.e. “contracts of adhesion”), some arbitration providers 
have voluntarily incorporated due process protections into their procedures and 
enhanced transparency with regard to process and outcomes.18 In international 
commercial arbitration, pressure to make the arbitration process more court-like 
has come from users themselves, even though they complain about the effects 
on time to disposition and expense.19 Pressure to reject arbitration altogether is 
strongest in the investment domain, where non-governmental organizations 
(NGO)—sometimes with the support of public officials—have led a movement 
to substitute a new, publicly administered and publicly funded adjudicative 
mechanism, with public access to process and outcomes, for investor-state arbi-
tration as currently designed and operated. 
Re-inventing a procedure designed for resolving private disputes to decide 
instead disputes with significant public policy dimensions risks diminishing the 
value of private dispute resolution for truly private disputes without fully satis-
fying the need for public dispute resolution for public disputes. We argue that it 
is time to more carefully analyze what disputes are most appropriately assigned 
to private and public procedures, rather than further blurring the line between 
private and public dispute resolution, lest we destroy what is valuable in both 
public and private procedures. 
The goal of this article is to assist in that analysis by presenting, side-by-
side, brief histories of the establishment and evolution of arbitration in domes-
tic, international commercial, and investor-state domains, and by highlighting 
the similarities among the challenges arbitration has encountered recently in 
                                                        
16  For detailed discussion, see infra Section III.B. 
17  See infra Section II.C. 
18  See infra Section I.C, for discussion on the due process and transparency procedures in-
corporated in consumer and employment arbitration. 
19  In the past few years, major international arbitral institutions responded to the concerns 
about time and cost by adopting special expedited procedures for smaller, less complex dis-
putes or based on the parties’ agreement. See discussion infra Section I.D. 
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each domain and among the responses to these challenges. Part II describes the 
evolution of arbitration in the United States, focusing on recent controversies. 
Part III discusses the parallel evolution of international commercial arbitration. 
Part IV discusses the historical background of investor-state arbitration, the 
public law framework that authorizes its use, and controversies about its use 
that have erupted in the past several years. The last Part concludes.  
In recent years, some commentators have incorporated arbitration in gen-
eral treatments of “alternative dispute resolution (ADR),” without distinguish-
ing carefully among different procedures.20 The discussion that follows adopts 
a traditional definition of arbitration: a binding adjudication of a dispute by pri-
vate decision-makers outside a public court system.21 We occasionally mention 
other dispute resolution procedures that may be used instead of or in addition to 
arbitration, such as mediation or other forms of conciliation or court-annexed 
non-binding arbitration. 
Arbitration is used in a wide variety of circumstances, including to assist in 
the resolution of state-to-state disputes. This article focuses narrowly on arbi-
tration, not ADR generally, and on the resolution of private disputes.  
In opting for breadth, we necessarily give up depth. As described above, 
there is rich literature in each of the three domains this article discusses. None 
of our accounts does justice to the research and analyses that have been con-
ducted by scholars and practitioners within each of these domains. We hope 
that introducing readers from one domain to developments in parallel domains 
will stimulate new thinking about appropriate and inappropriate uses of arbitra-
tion and potential reforms in arbitration law, rules, and practice.22 
I. PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC IN U.S. DOMESTIC ARBITRATION 
A. Early Evolution of U.S. Federal Arbitration Law 
 While the “alternative dispute resolution (ADR)” movement arose in the 
late twentieth century, arbitration dates back to colonial times in the United 
                                                        
20  For a critique of this trend, see Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of 
ADR?: An Argument That the Term “ADR” Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 97, 97–98 (2000). 
21  Id. at 99–100. 
22  Labor arbitration conducted under collective bargaining agreements constitutes a fourth 
important domain of arbitration law and practice. We follow traditional arbitration jurispru-
dence in distinguishing labor arbitration from commercial arbitration. For a discussion of 
this traditional distinction and argument that the distinction has become inappropriate since 
the U.S. Supreme Court has embraced an expansive view of the Federal Arbitration Act, see 
Stephen L. Hayford, The Federal Arbitration Act: Key to Stabilizing and Strengthening the 
Law of Labor Arbitration, 21 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 521 (2000). Comparative analy-
sis of trends in labor arbitration was beyond the scope of our present effort. 
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States.23 American colonialists carried with them from Europe the belief that 
merchants within various business communities should be free to resolve their 
disagreements outside of court, in private, and according to rules that they de-
signed rather than dealing with the technicalities and uncertainties of common 
law.24 Merchants doing business together agreed to refer their disputes to arbi-
trators selected from their own industry, who would decide the disputes in ac-
cord with that industry’s norms and without much attention to procedural tech-
nicalities.25 Arbitration took place outside of public view and the outcomes 
were confidential. Merchants preferred arbitration because they believed it was 
quicker and cheaper than litigation and because they believed specialist arbitra-
tors understood the nature of commercial transactions better than generalist 
judges; they also appreciated its confidentiality.26 
However, from time to time, one of the parties to such an agreement would 
try to wriggle out of arbitration by asking a court to void the contract’s arbitra-
tion provision or to deny enforcement of an arbitration judgment. Before the 
20th century, many judges were responsive to these requests.27 Unhappy with 
this state of affairs, the business community pressed for substantive legal re-
form to ensure the enforceability of arbitration agreements and awards,28 and in 
1920, New York passed an Arbitration Act compelling state court judges to en-
force arbitration agreements.29 Five years later, in response to business lobby-
ing, Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act—later retitled the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA)30—modeled after the New York arbitration 
statute.31 The FAA’s stated purpose was to put arbitration agreements on “equal 
footing” with other contracts and overcome “judicial hostility to arbitration.”32 
                                                        
23  KYRIAKI NOUSSIA, CONFIDENTIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POSITION UNDER ENGLISH, GERMAN, AND FRENCH LAW 13 
(2010). 
24  JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 32 (1983); see also discussion infra Part 
III. 
25 IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS 
IN AMERICA 20 (2013). 
26  AUERBACH, supra note 24, at 32–33. 
27  Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 98–99 (2012) (citing KATHERINE V.W. STONE & RICHARD 
A. BALES, ARBITRATION LAW 22 (2d ed. 2010)); see also Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Cas-
tle, The Revocability of Contract Provisions Controlling Resolution of Future Disputes Be-
tween the Parties, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207, 208–09 (2004). 
28  AUERBACH, supra note 24, at 102–03 (discussing the efforts of various merchant commu-
nities, including the New York Stock Exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade, and the fur, 
silk, cotton, and other industries to expand and legalize arbitration). 
29  Wilson, supra note 27, at 99. 
30  9 U.S.C. § 1 (1925). The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not apply to arbitration 
agreements under collective bargaining agreements. Wright v. Universal Maritime Service 
Corp. 525 U.S. 70, 82 (1998). 
31  Wilson, supra note 27, at 99–100. 
32  Id. at 93 & n.9 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 
(1924)). 
18 NEV. L.J. 381, HENSLER KHATAM - FINAL 3/27/18  2:33 PM 
Winter 2018] RE-INVENTING ARBITRATION 389 
Arbitration was perceived and promoted as an inexpensive, speedy, efficient, 
and final means of resolving commercial disputes.33 Finality was assured by 
incorporating in the FAA a provision strictly limiting the grounds for appeal, 
essentially to actual corruption or fraud.34 
In its early case law interpreting the applicability of the FAA, the U.S. Su-
preme Court recognized arbitration’s limitations on due process: no right to a 
jury trial where such would be available in a public court, lack of reasoned 
opinions, relaxed evidentiary standards, no formal right to discovery, and only 
very limited appellate review.35 The Court acknowledged that these limitations 
could have a substantial impact on the outcomes of disputants’ substantive 
claims and that some tribunals, by their very nature, are more suitable for cer-
tain types of disputes than others.36 The Court’s jurisprudence supporting arbi-
tration notwithstanding these limitations rested on three key assumptions: (1) 
that parties should be free to choose their preferred mode of dispute resolution; 
(2) that arbitration provisions, freely contracted for, represented the parties’ 
judgments that the benefits of agreeing to arbitrate disputes that might arise in 
the course of their business transaction outweighed the costs; and (3) that once 
parties had chosen arbitration, they should be held to their choice (as would be 
true with regard to any other contractual provision). In U.S. federal jurispru-
dence, arbitration gained “same footing” with court adjudication as a mecha-
nism for resolving disputes arising out of contract law.37 
B. The Expansion of Arbitration to Disputes Involving Public Policy 
Doctrines 
By the 1970s, American courts had begun to embrace alternative dispute 
resolution, which judges perceived as a more efficient and more satisfactory 
way of resolving civil disputes and—perhaps, not inconsequentially—a means 
of relieving trial court workloads.38 In the preceding decade, the U.S. Supreme 
                                                        
33  Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 595–96 
(1928). 
34  9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2002). 
35  See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 202–03 (1956); Wilko 
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–37 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
36  Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203 (“The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an im-
portant part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action.”). 
37  See Wilson, supra note 27, at 93. 
38  Harry T. Edwards, Commentary, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 668–70 (1986); Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 165, 165, 178 (2003). The inception of the ADR movement is normally traced to Prof. 
Frank Sander’s address to the Pound Conference on Causes of Public Dissatisfaction with 
the Administration of Justice, convened by then U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren 
Burger. See Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address Delivered at the 
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice (Apr. 7–9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976). On the notion that the U.S. Supreme 
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Court had begun to shift from the “equal footing” doctrine to a policy favoring 
arbitration.39 In 1983, the Court made this policy explicit in Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., declaring that section two 
of the FAA reflected “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, 
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”40 
Although, after 1925, many states had adopted statutes modeled after the FAA, 
in the 1980s, some states limited the use of arbitration in some circumstances. 
In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under the Commerce Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, the FAA preempted state arbitration law, including such lim-
itations.41 Henceforth, it was the U.S. Supreme Court that determined the reach 
of arbitration doctrine.42  
Having positioned itself as the sole interpreter of the scope of the FAA, the 
U.S. Supreme Court embarked on a process of authorizing the use of arbitration 
for a wide range of disputes, including those arising out of statutory and consti-
tutional law—arguably far beyond the remit intended by the U.S. Congress in 
the 1920s.43 In essence, the Court held that whenever parties agree to a contract 
incorporating an arbitration clause, they are bound to arbitrate any dispute that 
arises between them that can be construed as falling within the scope of the 
contract, without regard to the substantive legal basis of the claim.44 The Court 
                                                                                                                                 
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence has been shaped at least in part by perceptions of court 
overload, see, for example, G. Richard Shell, The Role of Public Law in Private Dispute 
Resolution: Reflections on Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 
397, 397–98 (1988). 
39  E.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967); see also 
Wilson, supra note 27, at 102; Resnik, supra note 1, at 2804. 
40  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
41  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor dissented 
from this opinion but subsequently joined the majority in supporting the broad scope of the 
FAA on stare decisis grounds. Today, only Justice Clarence Thomas (who joined the court 
long after Southland was decided) dissents from the majority’s view that the FAA preempts 
state arbitration law. 
42  Examples of state laws that attempted to limit the use of arbitration based on public policy 
concerns, and that were preempted by the FAA, include state laws that require litigation of 
wage disputes, Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987); laws prohibiting arbitral awards 
with punitive damages, Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 54, 56 
(1995); laws that lodge primary jurisdiction of certain types of labor disputes with the state’s 
commissioner, Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 356 (2008); or general public policy prohibi-
tion against agreements to arbitrate personal injury or wrongful death claims against nursing 
homes, Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533 (2012). 
43  See, e.g., Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal 
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) (statement of W.H.H. Piatt) (testifying that the 
FAA was not intended to “be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to 
give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as 
to what their damages are, if they want to do it.”); see also Wilson, supra note 27, at 98–99. 
44  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630–31 (1985) 
(holding that the defendant’s antitrust claims were arbitrable); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 221 (1987) (holding that claims under RICO and the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 can be arbitrated); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 
18 NEV. L.J. 381, HENSLER KHATAM - FINAL 3/27/18  2:33 PM 
Winter 2018] RE-INVENTING ARBITRATION 391 
also overturned state legislative efforts to warn parties that by agreeing to arbi-
trate they are giving up their rights to go to court.45 Over time, most state su-
preme courts adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s strict interpretation of the en-
forceability of arbitration clauses regardless of the substantive legal basis of a 
claim.46  
Recognizing the opportunity to keep consumers’ and workers’ claims out 
of court—and away from jury trial and possibly punitive damage awards47—
corporate counsel soon began to include arbitration clauses in a wide range of 
contracts of adhesion (i.e. form contracts).48 Consumer and worker advocates 
attacked such contracts on grounds of unconscionability, but without success.49 
Attempts to evade arbitration on procedural grounds—for example, arguments 
that arbitration providers’ fees frequently exceeded court filing fees50—also 
went nowhere. In fairly short order, consumers (including insurance subscribers 
and medical patients) and employees found that they were barred from taking 
their claims to court.51 
 As U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence was becoming more protective of 
consumer and employment contracts forcing individual plaintiffs to arbitrate 
claims rather than take them to court, consumer class actions appeared to be on 
                                                                                                                                 
20, 35 (1991) (holding claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are arbitra-
ble); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (holding employment 
claims generally are arbitrable) (abrogating Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (interpreting the FAA as inapplicable to any labor or employment contracts, citing 
Sec. 1 of the Act)). Justices Stevens and Souter (with whom Justices Ginsburg and Breyer 
joined) observed that the FAA’s well-documented legislative history makes it clear that it 
was not intended to apply to any labor or employment disputes. Id. at 127–28, 136 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
45  Doctor’s Assoc. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (striking down a Montana 
statute and holding that requiring warning language in special large format treated arbitration 
contracts differently than other contracts, thereby violating the purpose of the FAA). 
46  KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 542–45, 594–97 (2000). 
47  Although some states historically prohibited waivers of punitive damages in arbitration, 
e.g., Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 797 (N.Y. 1976), contemporary decisions 
hold that parties may include prohibitions on punitive damages in arbitration contracts. Ab-
sent such explicit prohibitions, arbitrators may award punitive damages. See, e.g., Stark v. 
Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. 2004). 
48 FAA’s legislative history suggests that the drafters of the Act did not intend it to apply to 
“take it or leave it” standard contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power reason-
ing that such contracts are “not really voluntary contracts, in a strict sense.” SZALAI, supra 
note 25, at 195 (referring to Senator Walsh’s concerns during Sales and Contracts to Sell in 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 
4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 10 
(1923)). 
49  STONE, supra note 46, at 594–97. 
50  Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (rejecting challenge to 
arbitration based on potential expense). 
51  Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in consumer and employment contexts is a uniquely 
American phenomenon, distinguishing U.S. arbitration from domestic arbitration in other 
countries. See Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 7, at 1646. 
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the rise.52 For corporations, class actions posed much more financial risk than 
individual actions, whether litigated or arbitrated. Recognizing yet another op-
portunity, corporate counsel began including bars to class actions in mandatory 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses.53 Initial judicial response to these clauses var-
ied, with some courts allowing arbitrators to decide whether a clause contem-
plated class arbitration and other courts severing and voiding bars against class 
actions included in arbitration clauses on grounds of unconscionability, while 
allowing the clauses to remain enforceable with regard to individual claims.54 
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,55ended 
all questioning about the enforceability of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses barring claimants from pursuing their claims in collective proceedings, 
whether in litigation or arbitration, reversing the Ninth Circuit’s prior decision 
voiding the provision on grounds of unconscionability. Two years later, the en-
forceability of class action waivers in mandatory arbitration clauses came be-
fore the Court again, this time in anti-trust litigation by small businesses against 
American Express. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,56 the 
businesses challenging the bar to proceeding collectively harkened back to the 
widely cited dictum in the Court’s 1985 opinion in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler 
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., in which the majority noted that an arbitration agree-
ment might be deemed unenforceable on public policy grounds if it prevented 
“effective vindication” of a “right to pursue statutory remedies.”57 The putative 
class representative in Italian Colors argued that only a class (or other group) 
can effectively pursue complex and expensive anti-trust litigation.58 Writing for 
the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia opined that the fact that it might be too ex-
pensive to pursue a statutory claim in individual arbitration was not equivalent 
to eliminating the right to pursue the remedy, and therefore was not contrary to 
the Court’s Mitsubishi dictum.59 Ironically, having embraced a public policy 
favoring arbitration in part based on the perception that labor arbitration in the 
collective bargaining context had produced industrial peace, the Court preclud-
                                                        
52  DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR 
PRIVATE GAIN 51–68 (2000). 
53  See generally Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate 
through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2004). In the early 2000s, Hensler was at a corporate counsel meeting 
at which including bars to class actions in mandatory arbitration clauses was recommended 
as a strategy to combat consumer class actions. 
54  See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Laster v. AT&T Mobility 
LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269 
(7th Cir. 1995); Brennan v. Ace INA Holdings, Inc., No. 00-2730, 2002 WL 1804918 (E.D. 
Pa. 2002); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
55  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
56  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. (Italian Colors), 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
57  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985). 
58  Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308–09. 
59  Id. at 2310–11. 
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ed the collective pursuit of remedies for collective harm in arbitration under the 
Federal Arbitration Act.60 
C. Responses to the Expansion of the Scope of Domestic Arbitration in the 
United States 
By expanding the substantive scope of arbitration, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence swept into arbitration’s embrace both a wider 
variety of disputants and a different type of relationship between disputants. In 
addition to disputes between commercial partners over contract terms and per-
formance, arbitration now could be applied to disputes: between investors and 
brokers over disclosure; between employees and employers about wrongful 
termination and discrimination in hiring, promotion, and wages; between con-
sumers and service providers over service and fees; and between patients and 
health care providers over malpractice. As a consequence, arbitration was no 
longer applied solely to relatively evenly-matched commercial partners, but al-
so to wildly unequal employees and employers, consumers and corporations, 
and patients and health care providers.61 
The Court’s decisions evoked critical commentary by legal academicians 
and practitioners and sometimes political opposition. More importantly for this 
discussion, they led to significant changes in arbitration rules and practice. 
Over time, domestic arbitration in the United States morphed from a private, 
informal, streamlined dispute resolution process, subject to little external scru-
tiny, to a much more formal and quite a bit more public—and arguably more 
expensive and time-consuming—procedure that increasingly resembles litiga-
tion. 
1. Securities Arbitration 
 Arbitration was well established within the securities industry before the 
Court’s 1987 decision in Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon.62 Various 
                                                        
60  For commentary arguing that starting in the 1980s, the Court imported its positive labor 
arbitration jurisprudence into its FAA jurisprudence, see Jonathan R. Nelson, Judge-Made 
Law and the Presumption of Arbitrability: David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft 
Ltd., 58 BROOK. L. REV. 279 (1992) and Allison Anderson, Note, Labor and Commercial 
Arbitration: The Court’s Misguided Merger, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1237 (2013). 
61  See, e.g., SZALAI, supra note 25, at 11 (examining archival sources from the early 1900s, 
including several hundred pages of memoranda and correspondence from the drafters of U.S. 
arbitration laws and arguing that the Supreme Court “has grossly misinterpreted these laws 
to support a system that is significantly more expansive than was originally intended”). 
62  Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238–42 (1987) (holding that 
claims under RICO and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 can be arbitrated). On the 
early establishment of arbitration forums for disputes among brokers, see Kenneth Durr & 
Robert Cooly, The Institution of Experience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities 
Industry, 1792–2010, SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y (Dec. 1, 2010), 
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/sro/sro02d.php [https://perma.cc/M8TR-CY 
T4]. 
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industry self-regulatory associations administered arbitrations under diverse 
rules. In 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) led an effort to 
develop a uniform arbitration code for arbitrating investors’ claims, which was 
subsequently adopted voluntarily by industry associations.63 By 1987, thou-
sands of claims had been adjudicated under this code.64 The decision in 
McMahon, placing investors’ contracts fully within the FAA’s scope, led to in-
creased attention to securities arbitration’s procedures and outcomes.65 Shortly 
after the decision was handed down, the SEC issued recommendations to the 
industry’s leading trade associations for new procedural requirements, includ-
ing pre-hearing discovery, transcripts of hearings, and closer assessment of ar-
bitrators’ qualifications.66 Within five years, some industry associations were 
also recommending that arbitrators follow the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
some practitioners reported that it had become increasingly common for law-
yers representing parties in securities arbitration to file briefs on relevant law.67 
Some securities arbitration forums published awards along with parties’ and 
arbitrators’ names and case summaries, including damages requested.68 
 Notwithstanding these changes, in the two decades following McMahon, 
there was unceasing criticism of the securities arbitration paradigm: self-
regulating industry organizations administering arbitrations between unhappy 
investors and employees of the organizations’ own industry. A raft of reforms 
promulgated by the SEC, which arguably had the effect of making arbitration 
even more like litigation, did little to quell the controversy.69 
Securities arbitrations are currently governed by an “Industry Code” issued 
in 2007 by FINRA, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.70 The Code 
includes rules for filing claims, location of hearings (required to be in the inves-
                                                        
63  Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
361, 363 (1987) (citing Uniform Code of Arbitration (as amended), reprinted in FOURTH 
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION Exhibit C (Nov. 1984)). 
64  Constantine, supra note 63, at 364. 
65  Id. at 361. 
66  Id. at 369–70. Commenting presciently, Katsoris wrote: “The dangers in the post-
McMahon era are efforts to recast arbitration as a clone to court litigation.” Id. at 370; see 
also Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of Securities 
Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1105 (1993) (analogizing reactions post McMahon to 
Prof. Higgins song in My Fair Lady, “Why Can’t a Woman Be More Like a Man,” substitut-
ing the words “Why Can’t Arbitration Be More Like Litigation?”). 
67  Poser, supra note 66, at 1106–07. 
68  Id. at 1107. 
69  Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitra-
tion, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 497, 516–19 (2008) (describing the controversy and arguing 
that investors are adequately protected by SEC oversight of arbitration forums and that any 
disadvantages experienced by investors are consequences of unfavorable substantive law, 
not arbitration procedures). 
70  Section 1300  Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes, FINRA, 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4193 
[https://perma.cc/D7Z5-9CRL] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
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tor’s location), selecting arbitrators, discovery and admissibility of evidence 
(e.g. document production, depositions and expert witness testimony), hearings, 
and awards. Hearings are recorded and awards must be written. Arbitration 
awards, along with case summaries and parties and arbitrators’ names, must be 
made publicly available.71 
2. Employment Arbitration 
After the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp.72 that the reach of the FAA extended to employment discrimination 
claims,73 labor arbitrators—who represent employees and management in dis-
putes that arise under collective bargaining agreements—became concerned 
that the perception that non-unionized employees were being unfairly forced 
into arbitration might undermine the credibility of labor arbitration as well. Be-
tween 1994 and 1995, the National Academy of Arbitrators convened a task 
force comprising representatives from various organizations, including the 
American Bar Association (ABA), American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
and National Employment Lawyers Association, to adopt principles for a “Due 
Process Protocol” for arbitrating statutory employment claims. Later described 
by Arnold Zack, the President of the National Academy of Arbitrators who 
chaired the effort, as “a rather modest undertaking to protect the credibility of 
labor management arbitration and to provide guidance to NAA arbitrators who 
might be undertaking such [employment arbitration] work,”74 the protocol pro-
vides that employees should have a right to representation of their own choos-
ing in arbitration, that employees should have access to “all information rea-
sonably relevant to their claims” both before and during the hearing, including 
pre-hearing depositions (i.e. at least minimal discovery), and that arbitrators 
should issue written opinions and awards.75 The American Arbitration Associa-
                                                        
71  Id. For a contemporary practitioner’s view of security arbitration, see Mark Astarita, 
Overview of the Securities Arbitration Process, SEC LAW.COM, http://www.seclaw.com/over 
view-securities-arbitration-process/ [https://perma.cc/P8FJ-XA68] (last visited Dec. 23, 
2017). 
72  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). 
73  Notably, legislative history of the FAA shows that it was not intended to cover labor and 
employment disputes. See SZALAI, supra note 25, at 152–53, 191–92 (referring, inter alia, to 
testimony during Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Fed-
eral Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 10 (1923) that the Act will have nothing to do with “la-
bor disputes, at all.” “It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of 
sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it. 
Now, that is all there is in this.”). 
74 LEE HORNBERGER, THE IMPACT OF THE DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL PRINCIPLES ON 
ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES IN MICHIGAN 1 (2007) (quoting Arnold 
M. Zack, The Due Process Protocol: Getting There and Getting Over It, 11 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 257, 257 (2007)), http://www.leehornberger.com/index.php?page=Lee_Hornb 
erger_Articles [https://perma.cc/3GY4-TZQ4]. 
75  Id. at 4. 
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tion (AAA), the oldest non-profit arbitration provider in the United States and 
JAMS, the leading for-profit provider of mediation and arbitration, as well as 
other organizations, have adopted versions of this protocol,76 and some courts 
have referred to it in assessing the fairness of arbitration contracts that are chal-
lenged.77 Some aspects of the protocol—e.g. regarding the selection of neutral 
arbitrators and the holding of fair hearings—are simply restatements of FAA 
provisions. However, the provisions regarding exchange of evidence are more 
reflective of litigation norms than traditional arbitration procedures. While not 
setting requirements regarding responsibility for paying arbitrators’ fees, the 
protocol also goes beyond the U.S. Supreme Court’s summary dismissal of this 
concern in Green Tree, by suggesting that at least in arbitrations involving 
“lower paid employees,” employers should consider partially subsidizing 
fees.78 The protocol explicitly declines to advise employers on the propriety of 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses. But the AAA currently advises potential clients 
that it may decline to administer arbitrations if the client’s dispute resolution 
program “substantially and materially deviates from [its] minimum due process 
standards.”79 
3. Consumer Arbitration 
 In 1997, as controversy over the enforcement of pre-dispute mandatory ar-
bitration clauses in consumer contracts mounted, the American Arbitration As-
sociation established a National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee.80 
The Committee formulated a Due Process Protocol for mediation and arbitra-
tion of consumer disputes, which is intended to provide guidance for resolving 
a broad range of consumer disputes outside the court system.81 Like the Due 
Process Protocol for Employment Arbitration that the AAA had endorsed, the 
Due Process Protocol for consumer disputes restates the provisions of the FAA. 
But, it also includes a recommended “notice of arbitration agreement” that 
clearly indicates that a dispute under the relevant contract will not be subject to 
court resolution.82 Ironically, the suggested notice goes way beyond the notice 
proposed by the Montana state legislature that the U.S. Supreme Court struck 
                                                        
76  Id. at 5–7. 
77  See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc., 105 F.3d 1465, 1488–91 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
HORNBERGER, supra note 75, at 8–11. 
78  HORNBERGER, supra note 74, at 2; Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 
(2000). 
79  AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC., EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION 
PROCEDURES 9 (2009) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION], https://www.adr.org/aaa/Sh 
owProperty?nodeld=/UCM /ADRSTG-o04362 [https://perma.cc/GSN3-PVWA]. 
80  AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC., CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL: STATEMENT OF 
PRINCIPLES OF THE NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 4 (1998) [herein-
after CONSUMER DUE PROCESS], https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository 
/Consumer%20Due%20Process%20Protocol%20(1).pd [https://perma.cc/7LUA-N6HS]. 
81  Id. at 5. 
82  Id. at 26–27. 
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down in Doctor’s Associates.83 Whereas the principles incorporated in the due 
process protocol for employment arbitration are described quite tersely, the 
Consumer Due Process Protocol is discursive, and formatted quite similarly to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with each statement of a principle fol-
lowed by extensive “Reporter’s Comments” that cite relevant academic litera-
ture and case law.84 For example, Principle 13, “Access to Information,” lays 
out competing views of the trade-offs associated with incorporating discovery 
in arbitration and includes discussion of issues such as privilege.85 Arguably, 
under the AAA Due Process principles, a consumer arbitration of a high-value 
complex dispute could take a very similar course as it would in litigation.  
While federal and state rules of civil procedure are binding on civil dispu-
tants, AAA’s rules have no formal legal bite. However, in 2014, the AAA is-
sued new supplementary rules for consumer arbitration requiring, inter alia, 
that any company wishing AAA to administer its disputes with consumers, reg-
ister its arbitration clause(s) with the AAA for its review and approval.86 If the 
AAA decides that the clause deviates from its stated guidelines, it will ask the 
business to either revise or delete the offending clause.87 Notably, the Consum-
er Due Process Protocol states “the arbitrator’s award should be final and bind-
ing, but subject to review in accordance with applicable statutes” and in the 
Reporter’s comments recommends that a brief written explanation of the award 
should be provided if requested by either party.88 In 2016, the AAA updated 
their consumer arbitration rules setting a cap of $200 for filing fees charged to 
the consumer-plaintiff, with all remaining expenses including arbitrators’ fees 
to be paid by the company-defendant.89 
                                                        
83  Doctor’s Assoc. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). The AAA recommended notice 
includes the following phrases: 
You thus GIVE UP YOUR RIGHT TO GO TO COURT to assert or defend your rights under 
this contract. . . . Your rights will be determined by a NEUTRAL ARBITRATOR and NOT a 
judge or a jury. You are entitled to a FAIR HEARING, BUT the arbitration procedures are 
SIMPLER AND MORE LIMITED THAN RULES APPLICABLE IN COURT. Arbitrator deci-
sions are as enforceable as any court order and are subject to VERY LIMITED REVIEW BY A 
COURT. 
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS, supra note 80, at 27. The AAA recommends that the notice be 
placed in a prominent “notice box” and be included in any online version. CAPS appear in 
the original. Id. 
84  See CONSUMER DUE PROCESS, supra note 80, at 9–10. 
85  Id. at 29–31. 
86  AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC., CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES 16 (2014) [hereinafter 
ARBITRATION RULES], https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Rules.pdf [https:/ 
/perma.cc/GGA7-5T43]. 
87  Michael L. Mallow & Christine Reilly, New AAA Consumer Arbitrations Rules Go into 
Effect September 1, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.a 
spx?g=b69810c8-c5b9-488d-8c85-821222164768 [https://perma.cc/QNE9-9YWV]. 
88  See CONSUMER DUE PROCESS, supra note 80, at 30–31. 
89  See ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 86, at 33. 
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While arbitration providers have focused on procedural reform, other enti-
ties have responded to controversy over consumer arbitration by demanding 
transparency about process and outcomes. In the wake of the revelation that 
Kaiser Permanente’s mandatory arbitration program in practice systematically 
disadvantaged its patient-subscribers,90 the health maintenance organization es-
tablished a Blue Ribbon Panel to recommend reforms in its mandatory arbitra-
tion system.91 To assure that Kaiser’s arbitration system met its stated goals of 
providing fair, efficient, and timely resolution of medical malpractice disputes 
against its providers, the Panel recommended that the health maintenance or-
ganization appoint an independent monitor to regularly audit and report process 
performance and outcomes.92 An outside lawyer who neither arbitrates disputes 
nor represents parties in arbitration was appointed to implement this recom-
mendation.93 The Independent Administrator issues annual reports on the pro-
gram, including number of filings, mode of disposition, outcomes (including 
settlement and monetary awards), and fees.94 
In 2002, California lawmakers adopted legislation that requires all private 
arbitration providers that offer consumer arbitration in California to publish in-
formation about their consumer arbitration cases, including: the nature of the 
dispute, name of the non-consumer party, name of the arbitrators, the total fees 
charged by the arbitrators, the mode of disposition, and the outcome.95 Howev-
er, in contrast to Kaiser’s arbitration system, compliance with California’s stat-
utory reporting requirements has been poor;96 a fact that is likely explained by 
                                                        
90  Engalla v. Kaiser Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 918 (Cal. 1997) (holding 
that a court may decline to compel arbitration when the arbitration process is infected with 
fraud. The court found that as operated, Kaiser Permanente’s arbitration program was biased 
against patient claimants). Kaiser Permanente is the largest health maintenance organization 
in California, serving some 8 million families. In recent years, it has expanded its services to 
other states. Fast Facts About Kaiser Permanente, KAISER PERMANENTE, 
https://share.kaiserpermanente.org/article/fast-facts-about-kaiser-permanente/ [https://perma. 
cc/GYG7-DZD5] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
91  EUGENE F. LYNCH ET AL., THE BLUE RIBBON ADVISORY PANEL ON KAISER PERMANENTE 
ARBITRATION, THE KAISER PERMANENTE ARBITRATION SYSTEM: A REVIEW AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 1 (1998), http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/pdfs/BRP-
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NA5-FNBW]. 
92  Id. at 28–30. 
93  OFFICE OF THE INDEP. ADM’R, STATUS OF THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS 
(2017), http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/pdfs/BRP-Status-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K73-
3Q54]. 
94  OFFICE OF THE INDEP. ADM’R, ANNUAL REPORT (2016), http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/pdf 
s/2016-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND2X-7XFZ]. All of the annual reports since 
the inception of the program are available on the Office of the Independent Administrator’s 
website. 
95  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2015) (originally enacted in 2002). 
96  See DAVID J. JUNG ET AL., PUB. LAW RESEARCH INST., REPORTING CONSUMER 
ARBITRATION DATA IN CALIFORNIA: AN ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA CODE 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.96 (2013), http://gov.uchastings.edu/docs/arbitration-report/201 
4-arbitration-update [https://perma.cc/ZW6H-GCWJ]. 
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the absence in California of an office charged with enforcing these require-
ments. 
D. Trends in Domestic Commercial Arbitration Generally 
 Traditional business-to-business arbitration, the “bread and butter” of 
commercial arbitration providers, has not proved immune to the changes de-
scribed above. Whether as a result of the evolution of arbitration in the securi-
ties, employment, and consumer spheres or for separate reasons, commercial 
arbitration in the United States has also become more like litigation in recent 
years.97 Extensive discovery, including substantial document production and 
witness depositions, leading to longer proceedings and higher costs is said to 
have become the norm, replacing the streamlined and less expensive approach 
of the past.98 Much like judges, arbitrators often decide summary judgment mo-
tions and motions to compel or sanction.99 Some observers claim that appeals 
of arbitration awards have also become more common.100 In response to chang-
es such as these, in 2007, the construction industry—long a stalwart user of ar-
bitration—deleted an arbitration clause from its standard form contract,101 leav-
ing litigation as the default option. In place of arbitration, the industry 
recommended alternatives viewed as more expeditious and less expensive, such 
as structured negotiations, evaluative mediation, and non-binding mini-trials.102 
 Notwithstanding the similarities in trends among different domestic arbitra-
tion domains, two features distinguish business-to-business arbitration on the 
one hand and securities, employment, and consumer arbitration on the other. 
Business-to-business arbitration remains truly voluntary. Meanwhile, investors, 
employees, and consumers are forced to sign contracts including pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses as a condition of employment or transacting.103 And while 
                                                        
97  Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of “Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 895 (2004); Gerald F. Phil-
lips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 37, 38 (Feb. 2003–Apr. 
2003). 
98  W. Alexander Moseley, What Do You Mean I Can’t Get That? Discovery in Arbitration 
Proceedings, CONSTR. LAW. 18, 24 (Fall 2006). 
99  Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 11–12 
(2010). 
100  Katherine A. Helm, The Expanding Scope of Judicial Review or Arbitration Awards: 
Where Does the Buck Stop?, 61 DISP. RESOL. J. 16, 25 (Nov. 2006–Jan. 2007) (arguing that 
finality, one of the touted features of arbitration has been diminished as the grounds for ap-
pealing arbitrators’ decisions have expanded in recent years). 
101  7 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON 
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 21:3 (2014). 
102  Id. § 21:3 & n.9. (citing John Hinchey & Laurence Schor, The Quest for the Right Ques-
tions in the Construction Industry, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 8, 8 (Aug. 2002–Oct. 2002). 
103  Exceptions to this general observation exist: Some business parties, such as franchisees, 
may be forced to arbitrate disputes under the terms of franchise agreements and some high-
level employees in large corporations may be permitted to decide voluntarily whether to ar-
bitrate or litigate disputes with employers. E-mail from Jean R. Sternlight, Dir., Saltman Ctr. 
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many of the due process protocols that have been adopted for securities, em-
ployment, and consumer arbitration include transparency requirements, busi-
ness-to-business arbitration remains strictly confidential. 
II. RESPONDING TO PRIVATE NEEDS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 
A.  From Early History to Institutionalization 
While arbitration’s history in the United States goes back several hundred 
years, the roots of arbitration outside the United States stretch back much fur-
ther. Dispute resolution mechanisms comparable to modern-day arbitration 
were popular in ancient China, Egypt, and India thousands of years before the 
Christian era.104 Ancient Greek and Roman laws provided a framework for pri-
vate parties to agree to arbitrate contractual disputes.105 In medieval Europe, 
associations of merchants in different trades established arbitration tribunals to 
resolve commercial disputes among their members.106 In England, the first act 
that formalized arbitration by members of trade guilds dates back to 1698.107 
Even after national  courts were established and took jurisdiction over other 
forms of civil disputes, domestic arbitration persisted, in some instances, along-
side the courts and in others, in the form of specialized commercial courts.108 
Eventually, arbitration became the dispute resolution mechanism of choice 
for international traders as well as domestic business.109 Merchants who traded 
across national borders—early global entrepreneurs—did not want to be hauled 
into a local court outside their home territory; they also did not want their dis-
putes to be decided by judges who lacked understanding of mercantile mat-
                                                                                                                                 
for Conflict Resolution, Saltman Professor, UNLV Boyd Sch. of Law, to author (July 20, 
2017, 7:41 PM) (on file with author). 
104  SIMON GREENBERG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AN ASIA-PACIFIC 
PERSPECTIVE 3–4 (2011) (noting that arbitration can be traced back to about 2100–1600 BC). 
105  Id. at 4; see also DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 203–11 
(1978). 
106  Lynden Macassey, International Commercial Arbitration,—Its Origin, Development and 
Importance, 24 A.B.A. J. 518 (1938). The paper was read before the Grotius Society of Lon-
don in Gary’s Inn Hall, Apr. 26, 1938. Id. 
107  LORD CROSS OF CHELSEA & G. J. HAND, RADCLIFFE AND CROSS: THE ENGLISH LEGAL 
SYSTEM 250–51 (5th ed. 1971). However, using arbitration was not without criticism and 
problems with enforceability. A leading decision by Lord Coke in 1609 allowed that a party 
might revoke its agreement to arbitrate once a dispute arose although it would thereby forfeit 
its performance bond. See Ernest Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration- International and In-
terstate Aspects, 43 YALE L.J. 716, 716 (1934). Consistent with this decision the English Ar-
bitration Act of 1698 allowed either party to withdraw its consent to arbitrate up until the 
arbitral award was rendered. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 104, at 5. 
108  W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 699, 704 (2016) (discussing development 
of pie-powder courts in England and commercial courts in continental Europe with judges 
that were elected by business communities). 
109  RENÉ DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 14 (1985). 
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ters.110 The response to both concerns was to establish private arbitration tribu-
nals in which judges chosen by the parties applied specialized trans-national 
customary law dubbed “lex mercatoria.”111 In 1883, the city council of London 
asked a committee to draft a proposal to establish an arbitration tribunal for 
domestic “and, in particular . . . trans-national commercial disputes” arising 
within the city.112 
International commercial arbitration responded to many of the same urges 
that led businessmen to choose arbitration rather than courts for domestic dis-
putes. The author of an article celebrating the 1892 inauguration of the London 
commercial arbitration tribunal wrote,  
This Chamber is to have all the virtues which the law lacks. It is to be expedi-
tious where the law is slow, cheap where the law is costly, simple where the law 
is technical, a peacemaker instead of a stirrer-up of strife.113 
The institutionalization of arbitration was also encouraged  by the in-
creased number of disputes following the Industrial Revolution, the resulting 
increased economic specialization, and development of new trade and industry 
associations.114 
The public policy argument for international commercial arbitration was 
similar to the argument in favor of domestic commercial arbitration: the 
arbitrators were deciding private disputes between private parties and although 
these disputes might have important consequences for the parties, they were 
unlikely to have much public impact. But, there was an additional argument for 
national governments to favor international commercial arbitration, which 
came over time to be the most important argument of all: international trade 
was regarded as the primary engine of national economic growth and domestic 
welfare, and arbitration was regarded as essential to international trade.115 Early 
                                                        
110  Id. 
111  Id. Contemporary lex mercatoria incorporates a web of “soft law” deriving from the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, UNCITRAL conventions on 
trade that bind signatory nations and harmonized national contract law. In practice, parties 
specify what national law they intend to govern arbitration of their international commercial 
disputes. See ALEC STONE SWEET & FLORIAN GRISEL, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: JUDICIALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY 35 (2017). 
112  History, LCIA, http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/history.aspx [https://perma.cc/LR78-GC24] 
(last visited Dec. 22, 2017) (the City of London Chamber of Arbitration was established in 
1892, after the passage of the English arbitration statute that guaranteed enforcement of arbi-
tration decisions. It was renamed the London Court of Arbitration in 1903 and subsequently 
renamed the London Court of International Arbitration). 
113  Edward Manson, The City of London Chamber of Arbitration, 9 LAW Q. REV. 86 (1893). 
Manson also noted that businessmen wanted their disputes to be resolved by people in their 
line of business, and according to their values, as had been true in England in the medieval 
era. Id. See also History, supra note 112. 
114  Craig, supra note 108, at 704. 
115  Macassey, supra note 106, at 518.  
“Present day schools of political philosophy may differ as to the ideal system of national organi-
zation: they may even contest the basis of international relationships. But on one point they are 
all agreed. Every nation, whatever school of political ideology it may exemplify, is convinced 
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recognition of these two principles—the importance of international trade and 
the importance of international commercial arbitration to international trade—
was reflected in the inclusion of arbitration provisions in bilateral trade treaties 
dating back to at least 1899.116 In 1919, a group of international entrepreneurs 
who called themselves “the Merchants of Peace” established the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, which, in 1923, created the International 
Court of Arbitration to resolve disputes “of an international character.”117 
How this belief in the criticality of arbitration to international trade devel-
oped is a long and somewhat complicated story. Arbitration had been endorsed 
as the best vehicle for resolving disputes between nations at the Hague Peace 
Conference in 1899, which established the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 
the Hague.118 In the wake of World War I, establishing peaceful methods of re-
solving international trade disputes came to be seen as critical to preserving 
global stability. The war had wreaked havoc on many nations, destroying, or 
severely injuring their economic and social fabric. After World War I, the ma-
jor European commercial nations adopted arbitration as the model for resolving 
disputes between businesses engaged in trans-border trade. Over time, the idea 
that a private scheme for resolving international business disputes, outside of 
public view and without public input, was good for national welfare, became 
                                                                                                                                 
that all foreign industrialists and merchants should be encouraged to import into their countries 
as much of its raw materials and manufactured products as they can by any inducement be pre-
vailed on to buy.”  
More recently, then U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry was quoted as articulating the same 
view while praising the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership at an appearance in Hawaii: “In 
the 21st century, a nation’s interests and the wellbeing of its people are advanced not just by 
troops or diplomats, but they’re advanced by entrepreneurs, by chief executives of compa-
nies, by the businesses that are good corporate citizens.” See ISDS: The Devil in the Trade 
Deal, ABC RADIO NAT’L (Sept. 14, 2014, 8:05 AM), 
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/backgroundbriefing/isds-the-devil-in-the-
trade-deal/5734490 [https://perma.cc/L7D9-ALXY]. 
116  Macassey, supra note 106, at 522 (citing, inter alia, the Franco-Belgian Convention of 
1899). 
117  Id. at 523. The International Chamber of Commerce was one of a number of international 
organizations that were established after World War I to promote international trade and the 
peaceful resolution of disputes between nations and between private citizens of different na-
tions. 
The world had few working international structures in the immediate aftermath of the first of the 
20th century’s global conflicts. There was no world system of rules to govern trade, investment, 
finance or commercial relations. That the private sector should start filling the gap without wait-
ing for governments was ground-breaking. It was an idea that took hold. 
History: The Merchants of Peace, ICC ALB., http://icc-albania.org.al/history/ [https://perma 
.cc/S74G-MSBN] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017); see also Who We Are: History, ICC, 
https://iccwbo.org/about-us/who-we-are/history/ [https://perma.cc/ESZ4-CFH6] (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2017). 
118  History, PERMANENT COURT OF ARB., https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/introduction/history/ 
 [https://perma.cc/PM8B-ZDK5] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). Today, the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration is a major forum for assisting businesses to resolve international disputes with 
national governments and other state entities, either by administering arbitration procedures 
or appointing arbitrators to “ad hoc” tribunals. Id. 
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deeply embedded within international trade and economic policy. Economic 
growth and trade in the aftermath of World War II further propelled 
development of international commercial arbitration.119 
B. Towards a Harmonized System of International Commercial Arbitration 
Most international arbitral awards are satisfied voluntarily, without the 
need for judicial enforcement.120 In fact, the ICC Arbitration Rules of 1923 
provided that the parties were “honor bound” to comply with the arbitral 
awards.121 However, as the international commercial community expanded and 
arbitration became wide-spread, a more formal system for the enforcement of 
arbitral awards was needed.122  
Early attempts to create a system for recognition and enforcement of arbi-
tral awards initiated by the ICC—the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Claus-
es123 that helped ensure respect for arbitration clauses and the Geneva 
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards124—had little support 
outside of Europe.125 However, after World War II, these efforts came to frui-
tion with the adoption of the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.126 The New York Convention, which 
was ultimately ratified by more than 150 countries, requires the member states 
both to recognize agreements to arbitrate and to recognize and enforce resulting 
                                                        
119  GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 104, at 9 (referencing to the establishment of the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development, one of the World Bank Group organiza-
tions, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). 
120  Craig, supra note 108, at 705 (referencing, as an example, the fact that more than ninety 
percent of ICC’s awards are satisfied voluntarily). 
121  Id. 
122  Id. at 706–07. 
123  Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 158 (1924). 
124  See generally Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, 
92 L.N.T.S. 302 (1929). 
125  The Geneva Protocol was ratified by twenty-four European states and only a few coun-
tries outside of Europe (Brazil, Japan, India, Israel, Iraq, Thailand, and New Zealand). For 
the text of the Geneva Protocol and list of the ratifications, see History 1923–1958, N.Y. 
ARB. CONVENTION, 
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/travaux+preparatoires/history+1923+-+1958 
[https://perma.cc/TM4N-A85S] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). The Geneva Convention was 
open to any country that signed the Protocol but was ratified by fewer states, including only 
two non-European states. See League of Nation Treaties, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/LONViewDetails.aspx?src=LON&id=548&chapte 
r=30&clang=_en#2 [https://perma.cc/P24A-CGC7] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
126  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. As of Dec. 20, 2017, there are 157 contracting states. See Status: 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNCITRAL, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html 
[https://perma.cc/WSW6-BBEY] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017). 
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arbitral awards.127 The United States ratified the New York Convention in 
1970, and incorporated it into its national arbitration law, the FAA.128  
Ratification of the New York Convention augmented the reputation and 
popularity of international arbitration. Businesses engaged in global commerce 
demanded protection against lawsuits brought in the courts of their foreign 
counter-parties, where logically those parties might have an advantage. At the 
same time, companies doing business across borders wanted to be confident 
that once a dispute was resolved, the decision of the adjudicator would be en-
forceable in every country’s courts. As major commercial nations continued to 
be unable to agree on a system of mutual recognition of each other’s court 
judgments—a situation that prevails to this day—arbitration was the only 
means to achieve this confidence.129 
In 1966, amid the climate of expanding international trade, the General As-
sembly of the United Nations established the UN Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL)130—an organization that has since played a key role 
in the development of international commercial arbitration. The UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, adopted in 1976, were incorporated in the procedural rules of 
many private arbitral institutions. The rules cover all aspects of the arbitral pro-
cess and contain a model arbitration clause that has been used in numerous ad 
hoc international commercial arbitration proceedings.131 
In 1985, to support the structure of international commercial arbitration 
and to harmonize national arbitration laws UNCITRAL promulgated a Model 
                                                        
127  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 
126 art I. 
128  9 U.S.C. § 201(1970). 
129  Notwithstanding years of efforts, and apart from regional instruments, such as the Brus-
sels regime in the European Union, there is still no international convention on the enforce-
ment of court judgments. The 1971 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters is presently only ratified by Albania, 
Cyprus, Netherlands and Portugal. See Status Table: Convention of 1 February 1971 on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=78 
[https://perma.cc/T93Q-ADJV] (last updated Nov. 10, 2010). Notably, there is no bilateral or 
multilateral treaty on enforcement of foreign judgments that includes the United States, ar-
guably because other states are generally reluctant to enforce U.S. judgments involving mul-
tiple or punitive damages and object to the U.S. courts’ assertion of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Enforcement of Judgments, TRAVEL.ST.GOV., https://travel.sta 
te.gov/content/travel/en/legal-considerations/judicial/enforcement-of-judgments.html [https:/ 
/perma.cc/M6HB-5ZM5] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017). 
130  G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), at 99 (Dec. 17, 1966). 
131  See G.A. Res. 31/98, at 182 (Dec. 15, 1976); UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL RULES ON 
TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION 31 (2014) [hereinafter 
UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY], http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitratio 
n/arb-rules-2013/UNCITRAL-Arbitration-Rules-2013-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YQN-BQQ 
V]. UNCITRAL rules were amended in 2010 and again in 2013. G.A. Res. 65/22 (Dec. 6, 
2010); G.A. Res. 68/109 (Dec. 16, 2013). 
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Law on International Commercial Arbitration132 National legislation based on 
the Model Law, often verbatim, has been adopted by seventy-five countries.133 
The common characteristic of all these laws is that they impose a much looser 
degree of control over international arbitration than pertains to purely domestic 
arbitration within those countries.134 The Model Law allows parties to agree to 
procedural and decisional rules that may not fully accord with a nation’s do-
mestic law, arguably eliminating differences among domestic law that might 
favor a disputant of one nationality over another,135 but perhaps also freeing 
corporations engaged in international trade to avoid legal restrictions that they 
view as unfavorable. 
Today, multinational corporations have many arbitration organizations to 
choose from, including traditional arbitration forums established almost a 
hundred years ago, such as the ICC,136 the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA),137 the American Arbitration Association International 
Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR),138 as well as relatively younger regional 
arbitration tribunals such as the Singapore International Arbitration Center 
(SIAC),139 the Dubai International Arbitration Center (DIAC)140 and the Hong 
                                                        
132  G.A. Res. 40/72, at vii (Dec. 11, 1985); UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2008), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/text 
s/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3W6-VF83]. The Model Law 
was amended in 2006. G.A. Res. 61/33, at viii (Dec. 4, 2006). 
133  See Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), 
with amendments as adopted in 2006, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncit 
ral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html [https://perma.cc/N7D6-AE5T] (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2017). Counting provincial as well as national governments, a total of 106 
jurisdictions have adopted the Model Law. Id. 
134  Craig, supra note 108, at 727 (the rationale for the difference is that states arguably have 
a stronger interest in the disposition of disputes that arise within their borders and involve 
exclusively domestic actors; also, they may have a greater ability to impose their will on 
domestic actors). 
135  See Id. at 756 (In particular, nations with developing economies have been perceived to 
be biased against more developed nations). 
136  ICC was founded in 1919 and its International Court of Arbitration was created in 1923. 
Who We Are: History, supra note 117. 
137  The LCIA was formally inaugurated in 1892. See History, supra note 112. The Law 
Quarterly Review wrote about the inauguration: “This Chamber is to have all the virtues 
which the law lacks. It is to be expeditious where the law is slow, cheap where the law is 
costly, simple where the law is technical, a peacemaker instead of a stirrer-up of strife.” 
Manson, supra note 113, at 86. 
138  The AAA was founded in 1926, but the ICDR was established in 1996. See About the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the International Centre for Dispute Resolution 
(ICDR), INT’L CTR. FOR DISP. RESOL., https://www.icdr.org (follow “about” hyperlink) 
[https://perma.cc/S8MR-JPKR] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017); AAA Mission and Principles, 
AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/MissionPrinciples [https://perma.cc/XF6J-ZSST] (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
139  Established in 1991. About Us, SIAC, http://www.siac.org.sg/2014-11-03-13-33-
43/about-us [https://perma.cc/FPQ6-79TK] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
140  Established in 1994. About DIAC, DUBAI INT’L ARB. CTR., http://www.diac.ae/idias/abou 
tus/ [https://perma.cc/W585-89TF] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
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Kong International Arbitration Center (HKIAC).141 The number of internation-
al arbitration institutions has increased dramatically,142 and their respective 
caseloads continue to increase significantly.143 In 2015, the total value of pend-
ing claims at just one tribunal, the ICC, was said to be more than $286 bil-
lion.144 National governments in developing economies have supported the 
establishment of new arbitration centers not just because they are perceived to 
create a favorable aura for international investment, but because arbitration 
generates revenue for its national seat, in the form of payments for real estate, 
ancillary services (e.g. for legal assistance, information technology, etc.), 
lodging, food, transportation, and other needs.145 Arbitrators compete with each 
other for appointments and key positions within arbitration institutions.146 In 
short, international commercial arbitration not only supports international 
commerce, it has become a business in itself.  
C. From Streamlined Dispute Resolution to Formal Adjudication 
Were the celebrant of the 1892 inauguration of the London Chamber of 
Arbitration—the predecessor of the London Court of International Arbitra-
tion—to observe its proceedings and those of its sister organizations in other 
parts of the world today, by all reports he would be deeply disappointed. Where 
                                                        
141  “[E]stablished in 1985 by a group of leading businesspeople and professionals in an ef-
fort to meet the growing need for dispute resolution services in Asia.” At A Glance: About 
HKIAC, HKIAC, http://www.hkiac.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/WE7F-UC3Z] (last visit-
ed Dec. 22, 2017). 
142  The American Bar Association lists eleven international arbitration institutions on its 
website. See Arbitration Resources, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/com 
add.cfm?com=IC730000&pg=1 [https://perma.cc/U7M6-HYB2] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
143  See, e.g., Reports, LIAC, http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/reports.aspx [https://perma.cc/2KZM 
-BLEK] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017) (reports dated 2000–2016 show a consistent increase in 
the cases referred each year); see also Markus Altenkirch & Nicolas Gremminger, Parties’ 
Preferences in International Arbitration: The Latest Statistics of the Leading Arbitral Insti-
tutions, GLOBAL ARB. NEWS (Aug. 5, 2015), https://globalarbitrationnews.com/parties-pref 
erences-in-international-arbitration-the-latest-statistics-of-the-leading-arbitral-institutions-
20150805/ [https://perma.cc/8M4P-FLG] (Among top five international tribunals with the 
highest annual number of new cases are China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission (CIETAC), AAA ICDR, ICC, LCIA and HKIAC); Caroline Simson, ICC Stats 
Show Record Number of Arbitrations in 2016, LAW360 (Jan. 18, 2017, 7:09 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/881958/icc-stats-show-record-number-of-arbitrations-in-2 
016 [https://perma.cc/W4CV-5HWE]. 
144  SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 111, at 45 n.38. 
145  On the notion that arbitration generates revenue, see, for example, Cedric C. Chao & 
Steven L. Smith, Becoming a Global Center for Arbitration, L.A. DAILY J. (Sept. 20, 2013), 
http://files.dlapiper.com/files/Uploads/Documents/DLA-Piper-9-20-13-Daily-Journal.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/5ZP2-D956] (arguing the California should take steps to make it a more 
attractive venue for international arbitration and referring to an estimate that a ten to twenty 
percent increase in arbitration in New York would generate an increase of $200–$400 mil-
lion in revenues for that city). 
146  SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 111, at 72. 
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arbitration was to be “expeditious where the law is slow, cheap where the law 
is costly, [and] simple where the law is technical,”147 international commercial 
arbitration is widely perceived to have become time-consuming, expensive, and 
procedurally rigid.148 Hearings are lengthy and frequently feature live testimo-
ny. Document production may be extensive. Although parties draft their arbi-
tration clauses once they have chosen an arbitration tribunal, that tribunal im-
poses its own procedural rules, which may be quite “technical.” For example, 
the ICC, which until recently had the largest caseload of international arbitra-
tion institutions, incorporates a mandatory review of arbitration awards by a 
panel of arbitration lawyers and ICC staff in its arbitral procedures.149 In short, 
arbitration looks a lot like litigation and adjudication in the United States,150 
albeit with private judges in private settings delivering confidential awards.151 
 Objective empirical evidence to support the perception of increasing “judi-
cialization” of international commercial arbitration152 is lacking, in large part 
because arbitration institutions—although they report numbers of cases filed 
and sometimes information about awards—report little about procedures in 
                                                        
147  Manson, supra note 113, at 86 (describing the “virtues” of the London Chamber of Arbi-
tration that later became the London Court of International Arbitration). 
148  Giorgio Bernini, The Future of Arbitration: Flexibility or Rigidity? in ARBITRATION 
INSIGHTS: TWENTY YEARS OF THE ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 48 (Julian D.M. Lew & Loukas A. Mistelis eds., 2007); see also Jean-Claude 
Najar, Inside Out: A User’s Perspective on Challenges in International Arbitration, 25 ARB. 
INT’L 515, 515 (2009) (arguing that “[a]rbitration has evolved into a process as costly and as 
time-consuming as traditional litigation.”). 
149  SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 111, at 101–07. 
150  See Elena V. Helmer, International Commercial Arbitration: Americanized, “Civilized,” 
or Harmonized? 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 35, 36 (2003). 
151  In response to criticism of the growing inefficiency and expense of arbitration proceed-
ings, many providers have created “expedited procedures” that attempt to return to the 
streamlined model of the past, at least for smaller value claims. Instead of panels of three 
arbitrators, cases may be heard and decided by a sole arbitrator, and there are strict time lim-
its for issuing procedural orders and awards. Discovery is strongly discouraged. Disputes are 
to be decided on written submissions. Where immediate relief is sought, a temporary arbitra-
tor may be appointed before the formal constitution of a panel. Some providers apply expe-
dited rules automatically to smaller claims, but parties with larger claims are free to agree to 
proceed in an expedited fashion. See Peter Morton, Can a World Exist Where Expedited Ar-
bitration Becomes the Default Procedure?, 26 ARB. INT’L 103, 103–04 (2010). For examples 
of expedited procedures, see, generally, INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INT’L DISP. 
RESOL. PROC.’S. 7 (2014), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/ICDR%20Rules_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CD2N-TSTK]; Arbitration Rules, ICC, at art. 30 (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration/#article_30new 
[https://perma.cc/HNW3-HXV3] (expedited procedures). Notably, in the international com-
mercial arbitration context “small claims” are denoted in hundreds of thousands or millions 
of dollars. For example, the ICDR expedited procedures apply to disputes where no claim 
exceeds $250,000. INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 151, at 7. The ICC ex-
pedited procedure apply to disputes where claims do not exceed $250,000, exclusive of in-
terest and the costs of arbitration. Arbitration Rules, supra note 151, at art. 1. 
152  Gerbay, supra note 1, at 224 & n.4 (citing surveys of users reporting dissatisfaction with 
the cost and duration of international arbitration). 
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practice. Using indirect measures of complexification of rules and contention 
between arbitral parties, Gerbay found little evidence of such a shift over the 
last two decades.153 What has changed is the complexity of trans-national trade 
disputes and the amounts of money at stake in arbitration: garden variety 
“trad[e] disputes” account for a smaller fraction of international arbitration 
caseloads, having been replaced by intellectual property disputes, disputes aris-
ing out of mergers and acquisitions, and disputes associated with regulated in-
dustries, such as oil, electric power, and telecommunications. A larger fraction 
of disputes involves more than two parties and multiple contracts.154 In sum, if 
international commercial arbitration is no longer the informal streamlined pro-
cess that was once envisaged, it likely is because international commercial dis-
putes are no longer the relatively simple disputes that process was designed to 
resolve. Moreover, contemporary disputes are more likely to involve public 
policies that are implicit in copyright and patent law and associated with regu-
lated industries.  
The fact that international commercial arbitration processes have mutated 
in response to changes in the character of disputes is not in itself surprising. 
What is more notable—particularly in an age that celebrates informal and con-
ciliatory forms of dispute resolution, such as mediation—is that the direction of 
change has been towards adjudicative models. Two signs of a preference for 
formal adjudication have been the requirement to publish reasoned awards155 
and the move to publish awards, albeit in redacted form (i.e. omitting names of 
arbitrators, parties, and key facts that might identify disputants), and only if the 
parties agree156 or in circumscribed circumstances.157 While requirements for 
reasoned awards have been justified as a means of enhancing the probability of 
enforceability, the publication of awards facilitates the development of a com-
mercial arbitration jurisprudence, wherein arbitrators can look to awards in 
previously decided similar cases as precedents.158 A jurisprudence promulgated 
by private individuals selected by private corporations and under no obligation 
to follow national laws and judicial decisions may concern independent observ-
ers, but it may give comfort to parties seeking predictable outcomes in a system 
where appellate rights are limited. 
                                                        
153  Id. at 236–38. It is possible of course that change set in more than two decades ago. 
154  Id. at 240–44. 
155  SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 111, at 101–02. 
156  INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 151, at 28. (redacted awards will be 
published unless parties agree otherwise). 
157  London Court of Arbitration rules, requiring publication of awards when arbitrators are 
challenged. See Thomas W. Walsh & Ruth Teitelbaum, The LCIA Court Decisions on Chal-
lenges to Arbitrators: An Introduction, 27 ARB. INT’L 283, 283 (2011). 
158  Arbitration rules have also been amended to strengthen disclosure requirements for arbi-
trators. Some commentators have suggested that this is a product of the entry of new arbitral 
institutions (without a track record) into the market and new arbitration customers with less 
knowledge of the clubby world of elite arbitrators. See Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1301, 1314–17, 1319–20 (2006). 
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III. PROTECTING PUBLIC INTEREST IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 
A. The Emergence of Investment Arbitration 
As international trade expanded, sometimes even the traditional interna-
tional commercial arbitration regime was not enough to create the kind of con-
fidence in dispute resolution that businesses demand. When an American multi-
national corporation does business in Germany, it faces a real choice between 
litigation in court and arbitration. However, large multi-national corporations 
do not operate solely in countries that adhere to the “rule of law.” Many of the 
most lucrative business opportunities in the world involve investment in coun-
tries without independent judiciaries and countries that are politically unstable. 
Many of these countries are anxious to attract foreign direct investment, to ex-
tract oil, gas, and other valuable resources, develop national electric power 
grids, or create modern telecommunication systems, but do not have a well-
developed “rule of law.” 
 After World War II, U.S., British, and Western European corporations suf-
fered substantial losses when the leaders of newly independent and developing 
nations in Africa and Latin America abruptly canceled projects, seized foreign-
owned properties, and nationalized enterprises built with foreign money.159 
Traditional international commercial arbitration had been designed for busi-
ness-to-business trade disputes, not for the disputes between corporations and 
national governments that followed. Not having a reliable dispute resolution 
mechanism to obtain compensation when investments were hijacked by nation-
al governments discouraged corporate investment in countries with developing 
economies.160  
Eventually, new leaders who were more favorable towards foreign inves-
tors emerged in these countries. Together, rich and poor countries looked for a 
way of both attracting investment to countries that needed it and guaranteeing 
that corporations in rich countries would be willing to make such investments. 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between—on the one hand—wealthy na-
tions that were home to corporations looking for places to invest their money 
and—on the other hand—poorer nations that wanted that money to build their 
economies, emerged as the means of creating a more certain financial cli-
mate.161 BITS were (and still are) intended to protect foreign corporations from 
unfair actions by the government of the country they have invested in, particu-
                                                        
159  See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 167 (2005). 
160  The developing and socialist countries using their numeric majority at the U.N. General 
Assembly adopted an international framework that allowed for expropriation without com-
pensation. See G.A. Res. 3201(S–VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic 
Order, ¶ 3(e) (May 1, 1974). 
161  During the post-World War II period, multi-lateral treaties became the favored instru-
ments for regulating trade among nations. But, by design, these treaties excluded trans-
national investments. Vandevelde, supra note 159 at 162, 170. 
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larly expropriation of the investors’ property.162 The first BITs were negotiated 
in the 1950s, but the use of bilateral treaties to govern foreign investment did 
not take off until the 1990s.163 By 2015, about 3000 BITs had been negotiated 
by 180 countries.164 
Lack of effective avenues to pursue compensation under international law 
beyond espousal (i.e. when a national government prosecutes a claim on behalf 
of its national) posed a special problem for foreign investors, as national gov-
ernments typically do not allow a private party (much less a foreign private par-
ty) to sue them for their discretionary decisions and investors’ own govern-
ments were often unwilling to sue another nation. Consequently, in 1966, the 
World Bank established a new dispute resolution system—the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)—to permit foreign 
investors to bring claims against host governments if a government took ad-
verse actions against the investors’ interests.165 ICSID was established under 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention”) with the hope that it would fa-
cilitate the settlement of investment disputes between governments and foreign 
investors and promote investment in development projects.166 Most of the 3000 
or so BITs negotiated to date contain a dispute resolution clause that refers any 
disputes that arise between a private investor from one of the countries and the 
government of the other country to either the ICSID167 or to an “ad hoc” private 
arbitration process operating under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.168 
                                                        
162  The United States’ goal in negotiating and promoting bilateral investment treaties has 
been to guarantee “prompt, adequate and effective” compensation in the event of expropria-
tion of U.S. corporate investors’ properties in foreign countries. See Id. at 171. 
163  Id. at 157–58, 169. 
164  See Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/ 
Pages/resources/Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-Database.aspx [https://perma.cc/YW7C-UD 
LA] (last visited Dec. 5, 2017). 
165  See About ICSID, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP., https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/ 
Pages/about/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/3JVX-HYNR] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). Gen-
erally, ICSID rules can only be applied to disputes arising out of “investments” as defined in 
the ICSID rules. Resorting to a forum for resolving investor-state disputes does not preclude 
pursuing the same underlying dispute in a WTO forum or under the provisions of a Regional 
Trade Agreement. See also Sergio Puig, The Merging of International Trade and Investment 
Law, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 4–5 (2015). 
166  Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions 
and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. 
AM. 885, 889 (2007). 
167  Id. at 886. 
168  See UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY, supra note 131, at 31. Whereas the ICSID 
Convention was adopted specifically to apply to investor-state disputes, UNCITRAL Arbi-
tration Rules were originally adopted to apply to international commercial arbitration gener-
ally, and only later came to be applied to investor-state disputes as well. See Norbert Horn, 
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules 2013 for Investment Arbitration, in A REVOLUTION IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL RULES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DON WALLACE, JR. 332–34 (Borzu Sa-
bahi et al. eds., 2014); see also Ian A. Laird, Transparency in Investor-State Arbitration, in 
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The ICSID dispute resolution system applies “to any legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State . . . and a national of 
another Contracting State.”169 As of the date of this paper, there are 161 “con-
tracting states.”170 Six countries have signed but have not ratified the ICSID 
Convention, and three former members (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) 
withdrew in 2007, 2009, and 2012.171 Among countries with large economies, 
Brazil, Mexico, India, and South Africa have never been ICSID members.172 
The United States has been a member of the ICSID Convention since its incep-
tion.173 Most of the approximately 650 investor-state arbitrations that had taken 
place through 2013 were conducted either by ICSID or under UNCITRAL 
rules.174 
B. The Judicialization of Investor-State Arbitration 
Originally, the rules for investor-state arbitration were similar to those of 
ordinary international and domestic commercial arbitration. The arbitrators 
(usually three) were selected by the disputing parties from a list provided by the 
organization administering the process (e.g. the World Bank’s Centre), the arbi-
trators’ fees were paid by the parties, oral proceedings took place behind closed 
doors with limited disclosure of documents (i.e. discovery), and arbitrators’ 
awards were confidential and therefore had no precedential authority. And then 
something curious happened—at least when viewed from a historical perspec-
tive: from a private procedure along the lines of traditional domestic and inter-
national commercial arbitration, investor-state arbitration began to morph into a 
semi-public process. 
                                                                                                                                 
A REVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL RULES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DON WALLACE, 
JR., supra note 168, at 352. 
169  INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 18 (2009) 
(2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/ICSID%20Convention%20Engl 
ish.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG3J-7DW6]. 
170  Database of ICSID Member States, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/D 
atabase-of-Member-States.aspx [https://perma.cc/JN47-N45M] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
171  See, e.g., id.; see also Nicolas Boeglin, ICSID and Latin America: Criticism, Withdraw-
als and Regional Alternatives, BILATERALS.ORG (June 25, 2013), http://www.bilaterals.org/?i 
csid-and-latin-america-criticisms#nh9 [https://perma.cc/BJ3F-J2TA]. 
172  See Database of ICSID Member States, supra note 170. 
173  See, e.g., id. 
174  Through 2013, 450 investor-state arbitrations had been held in the ICSID forum and 158 
under UNCITRAL rules; less than one-hundred had been concluded in other forums or under 
other rules. See Matthew Coleman et al., Choosing an Arbitral Forum for Investor-State Ar-
bitration, STEPTOE (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-10156.html [https:// 
perma.cc/9EWP-LJUP]. Other arbitral tribunals commonly referenced in BITs are: the Arbi-
tration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and the ICC. Id. 
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In 2006, the ICSID amended its rules to include provisions related to 
“transparency.”175 If there is no objection by a party, representatives of the pub-
lic may attend the oral hearings, neutral third-parties may submit statements for 
the arbitrators to consider (i.e. as amici curiae), and arbitrators’ awards may be 
published.176 Four years later, in 2010, UNCITRAL—the other major provider 
of investor-state arbitration rules—adopted similar rules entitled Transparency 
in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (“the Transparency Rules”).177 The 
Transparency Rules were slightly revised in 2013, and became effective on 
April 1, 2014, for treaties negotiated thereafter.178 Most documents relevant to 
an arbitration conducted under UNCITRAL rules must be made public, oral 
hearings must be open to the public, and the arbitrators’ awards must be 
published.179 The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules apply automatically to all 
investor-state arbitrations conducted under all treaties negotiated or renegotiat-
ed after April 2014, with dispute resolution clauses referencing UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, unless the parties explicitly excluded future disputes under 
these treaties from the transparency requirements.180 In contrast, under ICSID 
rules there is a presumption in favor of keeping outcomes confidential but par-
ties may agree to waive this in favor of public access.181 
In addition, in 2014, UNCITRAL promulgated the United Nations Conven-
tion on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (“the Mauritius 
Convention on Transparency”), which applies the UNCITRAL transparency 
                                                        
175  See Ignacio Torterola, The Transparency Requirement in the New UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion Rules: A Premonitory View, INV. TREATY NEWS (Sep. 23, 2010), 
www.iisd.org/itn/2010/09/23/the-transparency-requirement-in-the-new-uncitral-arbitration-
rules-a-premonitory-view/. 
176  See Id. ICSID Rule 32 (open hearings); Rule 37(2) on amicus curiae; Rule 48 (publica-
tion of arbitration awards). The ICSID transparency rules were first applied in 2007. 
177  See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor State Arbitration, 
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparenc 
y.html [https://perma.cc/35HF-VQ6C] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
178  Id. 
179  The 2014 adoption of the new UNCITRAL transparency rules followed years of debate 
and controversy. A prime argument in favor of transparency was that, in many countries, 
proceedings involving the national government were by law open to the public. Also, special 
international tribunals established to resolve certain disputes, such as the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, operated in a transparent fashion. See, e.g., Torterola, supra note 175. Torterola 
notes that historically some 19th century arbitration tribunals, as well as the International 
Court of Justice and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, provided 
for public access when arbitrators were deciding matters related to states acting within their 
sovereign powers. Id. 
180  In effect, only the states that negotiate the treaties, not a corporate investor bringing a 
claim against the state under the dispute resolution clause, may set aside the transparency 
requirements. Id. 
181  According to Adam Raviv, a majority of ICSID decisions are published. Adam Raviv, 
Achieving a Faster ICSID, in 4 RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
SYSTEM: JOURNEYS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 657 n.10 (Jean Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 
2015). 
18 NEV. L.J. 381, HENSLER KHATAM - FINAL 3/27/18  2:33 PM 
Winter 2018] RE-INVENTING ARBITRATION 413 
rules to treaties negotiated before April 2014.182 As of October 2017, the Con-
vention had been signed by twenty-two countries, including the United States, 
but has entered into force for Switzerland, Canada, and Mauritius .183 The Eu-
ropean Commission is providing financial support to the Registry established 
by the Convention to publish awards.184  
 A number of arguments have been put forth for increased transparency in 
investment arbitration. As the number of disputes between investors and na-
tional governments multiplied, representatives of some nations began to argue 
that because the defendants were national governments, national laws requiring 
open access to court proceedings and trial outcomes applied.185 Additionally, 
many investor-state disputes concern foreign investments in public services, 
development of natural resources and public utilities—sectors in which the 
public has a strong interest and which may affect significantly the host coun-
try’s economy.186 Thirdly, it is not uncommon that investor-state disputes in-
volve allegations of corruption and bribery by governmental officials—an area 
that is appropriately of great public concern.187 
Arguments favoring transparency gained force when some countries were 
told by investment arbitration tribunals that they had to pay large sums of tax-
payers’ money to compensate private corporations for violations of investment 
agreements.188 To some citizens of these countries, the fact that the decisions 
were being made by private arbitrators, including privately-paid arbitrators se-
                                                        
182  See UNCTAD, IIA ISSUES NOTE: TAKING STOCK OF IIA REFORM 1, 11 (2016) [hereinafter 
IIA ISSUES NOTE], http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Publications/Details/142 [https://pe 
rma.cc/RR83-K6FX] (the Convention has not yet entered into force). 
183  See Status: United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State 
Arbitration, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014 
Transparency_Convention_status.html [https://perma.cc/E4M4-898V] (last visited Sept. 13, 
2017). 
184  See European Commission to Continue its Support of the Operation of UNCITRAL 
Transparency Registry for a Further Three Years, UNIS (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.unis.un 
vienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2016/unisl240.html [https://perma.cc/Y7ZM-499E]. 
185  Torterola, supra note 175. 
186  See, e.g., MEG KINNEAR, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISP., 2016 ANNUAL 
REPORT 34 (2016), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID_AR16_Engli 
sh_CRA_bl2_lhh,spreads.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7T6-MUGK] (showing that thirty-five per-
cent of cases involved electric power and other energy, twenty percent of cases involved oil 
and gas concessions, and the remaining cases included telecommunication; transportation, 
construction; agriculture, fishing and forestry, etc.). 
187  James D. Fry & Odysseas G. Repousis, Towards a New World for Investor-State Arbitra-
tion Through Transparency, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 795, 805 (2016) (citing World Du-
ty Free Company Limited v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Oct. 4, 
2006, Award, ¶¶ 129, 167–88 (involving a bribe paid to the Kenyan President)). 
188  Id. at 805–06. For example, in 2012, an ICSID arbitration panel ordered Ecuador to pay 
Occidental Petroleum $2.3 billion in a dispute over expropriation of oil drilling rights. Jona-
than Weisman, Trans-Pacific Partnership Seen as Door for Foreign Suits Against U.S., N. 
Y. TIMES, (Mar. 25, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/business/trans-pacific-
partnership-seen-as-door-for-foreign-suits-against-us.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/96XB-NM 
H3]. 
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lected by the plaintiff-corporation, raised concerns about bias towards corporate 
parties, and made the decisions illegitimate, even though under investor-state 
arbitration rules the country itself had also selected one of the arbitrators.189 
The fact that the proceedings took place behind closed doors did not help to 
dispel these perceptions of illegitimacy.190 
Unease with investor-state arbitration grew when multinational corpora-
tions adopted a new strategy of using the procedure to challenge legislative 
mandates that were intended to improve public health and safety or protect the 
environment. Perhaps the most notorious of these corporate efforts was Philip 
Morris International’s challenge to Australia’s “plain packaging” tobacco legis-
lation.191 After Australia’s parliament enacted a law prohibiting tobacco com-
panies from decorating cigarette packages with their company’s logo, Philip 
Morris, along with other tobacco companies challenged the law, claiming that it 
deprived the company of the value of their trademark.192 The companies took 
the case all the way up to Australia’s High Court, where they suffered a re-
sounding defeat.193 But that did not end the tobacco companies’ attack on Aus-
tralia’s legislation. Taking advantage of a previously negotiated BIT between 
Hong Kong and Australia, Philip Morris’s Hong Kong subsidiary brought an 
arbitration claim against Australia arguing, essentially, that Australia’s plain 
packaging regulations constituted an “expropriation” under the treaty.194 Al-
though investor-state arbitration is usually invoked by corporations to obtain 
                                                        
189  Typically, in arbitration, each party chooses an arbitrator who is supposed to be neutral, 
but nonetheless is presumed to have that party’s interest in mind, and then the two party-
selected arbitrators choose a third arbitrator to chair the panel (and break any tie between the 
party-selected arbitrators). See, e.g., UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY, supra note 131, 
at 11 (referencing Article 9). 
190  Fry & Repousis, supra note 187, at 806–07. 
191  The original challenge to Australia’s statute was brought by British Tobacco and JT In-
ternational. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. (Hong Kong) v. Australia (Tobacco Plain Packaging 
Case), PCA Case Repository No. 2012-12, Award, at 1–3 (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.pcac 
ases.com/web/sendAttach/1711 [https://perma.cc/DQ6K-C92U]. Philip Morris was an inter-
vening party in support of BT. See British Am. Tobacco Australasia Ltd. v. Commonwealth 
[2012] HCA 43 (Austl.); JT Int’l SA v. Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.). 
192  Tobacco Plain Packaging Case, ¶¶ 6–7. 
193  For the separate opinions and conclusions reached by each High Court’s Justice, see Brit-
ish Am. Tobacco Australasia Ltd., ¶ 45; JT Int’l SA, ¶¶ 159–60, 189–91, 242–43, 306–07, 
373–74. 
194  See Tobacco Plain Packaging Case. There were several unusual aspects of Philip Morris’ 
action. First, it filed its ICSID claim in anticipation of the Australian legislation (which Phil-
ip Morris had lobbied against unsuccessfully). Second, it asked for an injunction against the 
legislation, whereas the normal remedy in investor-state arbitration is compensation. Moreo-
ver, Australia argued that Philip Morris Asia (the Hong Kong subsidiary) had purchased an 
interest in Philip Morris Australia only shortly before the passage of the legislation, and for 
the purpose of being able to bring a claim in investor-state arbitration. See also Puig, supra 
note 165, at 34–35. Australia’s investment treaty with Hong Kong was one of only twenty-
eight treaties Australia had ratified with ISDS provisions. The TPP would have been the first 
agreement between Australia and the United States with an ISDS provision. ISDS: The Devil 
in the Trade Deal, supra note 115. 
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monetary compensation for an alleged violation of an investment agreement, 
Philip Morris requested that the arbitrators enjoin Australia from implementing 
its regulations, in essence asking the private arbitrators to put themselves in the 
position of Australia’s high court justices. Ultimately, Australia prevailed in the 
arbitration when the arbitrators ruled that they did not have jurisdiction over 
Philip Morris’s claim because it did not come within the treaty language on 
what constituted an expropriation.195 Australia later announced that it would 
not include investor-state arbitration clauses in its future treaties.196  
Although Philip Morris’s attempt to use investor-state arbitration to 
preempt anti-smoking regulations attracted the widest attention, Philip Morris 
is not the only corporation to attempt to leverage investor-state arbitration 
against national substantive law. Corporations have brought investor-state arbi-
tration claims against the United States and Canada seeking relief from stricter 
environmental regulation, against Germany for deciding to phase out nuclear 
power plants in the wake of the nuclear reactor disaster in Fukushima, against 
Canada challenging a Canadian (trial) court’s interpretation of the scope of pa-
tent protection for a pharmaceutical product (upheld by that country’s federal 
Court of Appeals), and against Guatemala for setting electric utility customers’ 
fees lower than the corporation had anticipated at the time of its investment.197 
                                                        
195  Kavaljit Singh, ISDS Arbitration Upholds Australia’s Plain Packaging Laws, E. ASIA F. 
(Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/01/15/isds-arbitration-upholds-australias 
-plain-packaging-laws/ [https://perma.cc/93MS-NSPD]. 
196  Puig, supra note 165, at 35. See Leon E Trakman, Choosing Domestic Courts Over In-
vestor-State Arbitration: Australia’s Repudiation of the Status Quo, 35 U. N.S.W. L.J. 979, 
985–87 (2012). A similar attempt by Philip Morris to use investor-state arbitration to 
preempt Uruguay’s anti-smoking regulation also failed. However, critics of investor-state 
arbitration pointed out that Philip Morris’ aggressive use of arbitration to contest anti-
smoking regulation imposed hefty legal costs on the countries it claimed against, and had the 
potential (perhaps intentional) to chill anti-smoking regulation, particularly by smaller and 
less wealthy countries that would not have the resources of an Australia to defend their legis-
lative mandates. Perhaps in response to growing opposition to Philip Morris’s strategy, the 
US Trade Representative proposed in 2014 that the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPP)—a treaty that President Trump recently set aside, as discussed infra—have a so-called 
“carve out” for anti-smoking regulation. The tobacco industry was joined by other industry 
representatives in lobbying fiercely against this idea, suggesting that at least some corporate 
lobbyists were looking forward to the possibility of using investor-state arbitration as a 
shield against product safety regulation. Puig, supra note 165, at 35 n.168 (citing Michael 
Bloomberg, Op-Ed: Why is Obama Caving on Tobacco? N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/23/opinion/why-is-obama-caving-on-tobacco.html). 
197  JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 2–3. Johnson’s co-author, Prof. Jeffrey Sachs, is a not-
ed American economist and expert on international development. See James Billingsley, Eli 
Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada and the Perils of Investor-State Arbitra-
tion, APPEAL, 2015, at 27 (discussing investor-state arbitration claims against Canadian 
courts’ interpretation of patent protection for pharmaceutical products); see also Caroline 
Simson, Teco Brings Electricity Row with Guatemala to D.C. Court, LAW360 (Jan. 17, 2017, 
5:01 PM), https://www.l aw360.com/articles/881490/teco-brings-electricity-row-with-
guatemala-to-dc-court [https://p 
erma.cc/YK3G-MFXV] (reporting on investor-state arbitration claims against Guatemala’s 
electricity pricing decision). 
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Some of these corporations prevailed in arbitration, and some did not.198 When 
corporations prevailed, they asked courts to confirm the arbitrators’ award, just 
as would happen if a business won an award against another business in a do-
mestic arbitration case. In other words, while private arbitrators made the deci-
sions that determined the outcomes of these claims, publicly-appointed judges 
were brought into play to enforce the decisions (whether or not the judges 
might have made those decisions themselves). Although under the New York 
Convention we expect courts to enforce arbitration awards, expecting a court to 
enforce an arbitration decision that overturned a court judgment seems incon-
gruous when there is no hint that the original court decision was a consequence 
of extra-legal forces. 
As the number of investors’ claims challenging governments’ public policy 
decisions mounted, there were cries for countries to abandon the investor-state 
arbitration provisions of treaties they had previously ratified. Opposition came 
from international economics and law scholars,199 NGOs, and even from some 
international arbitration practitioners.200 Critics argued that national substantive 
and procedural law were being pushed aside without open and reasoned de-
bate,201 and that the threat of multi-million-dollar arbitration awards would 
cause legislators to back away from regulating global corporations’ behavior, 
and judges to be wary of interpreting domestic law in a fashion that might lead 
to costly investor claims.202 Investor-state arbitration was invented to protect 
corporations and investors from governments that operated outside the “rule of 
                                                        
198  JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 16–17. 
199  Id. at 1; ISDS: The Devil in the Trade Deal, supra note 115. “ ‘If you think that all this 
discussion of ISDS is scare-mongering, just have a look at what’s happened to Canada under 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States. It’s all there 
ready and waiting to happen to us [Australia].’ ” Professor of Law Thomas Faunce, Australi-
an National University. According to ABCNet, the Canadian case Prof. Faunce referred to 
was a claim brought under NAFTA by Ethyl, an American chemical company, against Can-
ada, for banning MMT, a fuel additive. Canada agreed to settle the claim by paying Ethyl 
$13 million, rescinding the ban, and publishing a statement declaring that MMT is safe. 
200  ISDS: The Devil in the Trade Deal, supra note 115. 
‘What has happened, in my view, is an expansion of the field well beyond the contemplation of 
those who originally designed it,’ says Toby Landau, a leading arbitration lawyer who works 
with ISDS. ‘The kinds of cases are expanding in terms of scope. They are covering all forms of 
governmental activity wherever that activity might have an adverse impact on a foreign invest-
ment, for example cigarette packaging, regulation of carbon emissions, nuclear policy and taxa-
tion.’ 
Id. 
201  JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 3. 
ISDS provides significant substantive and procedural rights to individuals and corporations 
based solely on their foreign nationality, and outsources development and interpretation of law 
to private arbitrators insulated from crucial checks and balances. Through this grant of rights and 
transfer of lawmaking power, ISDS threatens to undermine legal systems and policymaking at 
the domestic level. 
Id. 
202  Billingsley, supra note 197, at 39–40. 
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law”; now it was being turned into a weapon for corporations to undermine 
laws properly adopted by democratic governments, critics charged.203 
The addition of “transparency” provisions to the ICSID Rules and the 
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules did not stem the flow of criticism: those 
Rules were too easily waived, the critics said.204 Moreover, “transparency” did 
nothing to mitigate the facts that investor-state disputes were being resolved by 
a small group of “elite” corporate lawyers perceived to be biased in favor of 
multinational corporations205 and that ambiguous BIT language was allowing 
                                                        
203  Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-
settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-
e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?utm_term=.668f8581dede [https://perma.cc/ZV2U-BUX6]. 
Why create these rigged, pseudo-courts at all? What’s so wrong with the U.S. judicial system? 
Nothing, actually. But after World War II, some investors worried about plunking down their 
money in developing countries, where the legal systems were not as dependable. They were 
concerned that a corporation might build a plant one day only to watch a dictator confiscate it 
the next. To encourage foreign investment in countries with weak legal systems, the United 
States and other nations began to include ISDS in trade agreements. Those justifications don’t 
make sense anymore, if they ever did. Countries in the TPP are hardly emerging economies with 
weak legal systems. Australia and Japan have well-developed, well-respected legal systems, and 
multinational corporations navigate those systems every day, but ISDS would preempt their 
courts too. And to the extent there are countries that are riskier politically, market competition 
can solve the problem. Countries that respect property rights and the rule of law—such as the 
United States—should be more competitive, and if a company wants to invest in a country with 
a weak legal system, then it should buy political-risk insurance. 




204  JONATHAN BONNITCHA ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY 
REGIME 233 (2017). 
205  See Stanislaw Soltysinski, The Dispute About the Legitimacy of Investment Arbitration: 
Is the Principle of Equality of Parties an Outdated Concept?, in A REVOLUTION IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL RULES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DON WALLACE, JR., supra note 168, at 
315, 320–21 (citing data from a study by Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet showing that fifteen 
arbitrators decided fifty-five percent of investor-state disputes in 2011, but disputing “critical 
opinions that ‘elite’ arbitrators have formed a ‘mafia’ and many of them have not even 
demonstrated expertise in international law.”); see also Robert Howse, India Should Not Let 
Europe Undermine Its New BIT and TRIPs Flexibilities for Medicines, SUNDAY GUARDIAN 
LIVE (Feb. 25, 2017), http://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/8516-india-should-not-
let-europe-undermine-its-new-bit-and-trips-flexibilities-medicines 
[https://perma.cc/8YZZXAPY] (“The arbitrators constitute a small elite of lawyers dominat-
ed by West European males, who also act as counsel in cases on related matters, an egre-
gious conflict of interest uncontrolled by arbitration rules. . . . It is a challenge to rein in . . . 
expansion of [substantive] jurisdiction by arbitrator creativity, since arbitrators are judges for 
hire, and when they grant jurisdiction they get paid handsomely to hear the case. . . . Impar-
tial judges well qualified in public law and compensated mostly through a fixed salary would 
be a big improvement over commercial lawyers and entrepreneurial academics who engage 
in arbitration as a route to personal wealth.”). 
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these decision-makers to favor corporations seeking to undermine national pol-
icies.206 
Ultimately, opposition to investor-state arbitration provisions became an 
important factor in controversy over newly proposed treaties intended to regu-
late trade and investment between certain nations: the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
agreement (TPP)207 and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
agreement (TTIP).208 Since taking office, the Trump administration has begun 
re-negotiating the North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which he has 
loudly opposed as not being fair to the United States.209 Among the treaty chap-
                                                        
206  Soltysinski, supra note 205, at 321–25. But see Susan D. Franck, Conflating Politics and 
Development? Examining Investment Treaty Arbitration Outcomes, 55 VA. J. INT’L. L. 13, 
65 (2014) (presenting empirical evidence disputing these claims, and showing “(1) states 
won in equal or greater proportions than investors; (2) measures of central tendency indicat-
ed that investors won less than US$20 million on average overall; and (3) in those cases 
where investors were successful, investors’ relative success was roughly 30% of the amount 
claimed.”). 
207  The proposed signatories to the multi-lateral TPP were Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. 
On his first day in office, President Donald Trump, who during his campaign referred to the 
treaty as a “horrible deal,” withdrew the U.S. from the agreement. TPP: What Is It and Why 
Does It Matter, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32498715 
[https://perma.cc/JQE3-D6TJ]; see also Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), OFF. U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partn 
ership (last visited Dec. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/QX3T-55FX]. Subsequently, the other 
proposed signatories re-started negotiations. See Motoko Rich, TTP, the Trade Deal Trump 
Killed, is Back in Talks Without U.S., N.Y TIMES (Jul. 14, 2017), https://www.nytime 
s.com/2017/07/14/business/trans-pacific-partnership-trade-japan-china-globalization.html [ht 
tps://perma.cc/E3MB-ZRZ6]. In November 2017, eleven Pacific Rim countries agreed to 
move ahead with the agreement with the goal of obtaining signatures in early 2018. See 
Shawn Donnan, Long Live the TPP – Pacific Trade Pact Survives Largely Intact, FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/c5cdd3aa-c82d-11e7-ab18-7a9fb7d6163e 
[https://perma.cc/9V4S-DU5A]. ISDS clause remains in the renegotiated agreement, but its 
scope is restricted. Id.  The long running controversy over the ISDS provision of the TPP 
was not helped by the fact that its text was kept from the public. According to New York 
Times reporter Jonathan Weisman, the ISDS clause in the TPP was to be classified for four 
years after the agreement became effective or negotiations definitely failed; the Times said it 
had obtained the provision from WikiLeaks. Ironically, the classified TPP ISDS clause was 
reported to include transparency requirements. See Weisman, supra note 188. 
208  The TTIP proposed to regulate a wide range of trade and investment between the United 
States and the European Union. See U.S.-EU Joint Report on Progress to Date, OFF. U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Jan. 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pr 
ess-releases/2017/january/us-eu-joint-report-t-tip-progress-0 [https://perma.cc/C4ZE-XSK 
E]. The proposed TTIP was a subject of controversy in both the U.S. and the EU, for a varie-
ty of reasons including the investor-state dispute resolution provisions. See, e.g., Stuart Jef-
fries, What Is TTIP and Why Should We Be Angry About It?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2015, 1:15 
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/aug/03/ttip-what-why-angry-transatl 
antic-trade-investment-partnership-guide [https://perma.cc/MH4J-EUTL]. 
209  Ana Swanson, Trump’s Tough Talk on NAFTA Raises Prospects of Pact’s Demise, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/business/economy/nafta-trump. 
html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6PTF-8J48]. Both the TPP and NAFTA (the North American 
Trade Agreement between the U.S., Canada and Mexico, ratified by the U.S. in 1994) are 
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ters proposed for reform or elimination are provisions on state-state and inves-
tor-state dispute settlement.210 Meanwhile, a number of other countries have 
announced their intentions to drop investor-state arbitration clauses from future 
bilateral investment treaties or withdraw from current treaties with investor-
state arbitration clauses.211 
With concern rising that the framework of international investment is com-
ing apart, there are multiple moves afoot to amend the substantive provisions of 
bilateral and multilateral investment treaties: to safeguard countries’ rights to 
regulate in the areas of health and safety, environmental protection, and labor 
standards, to better balance national and investor obligations, and to strengthen 
procedural fairness of investor-state arbitration.212 In their recently negotiated 
trade and investment treaty (CETA), the European Union and Canada turned 
their backs on investor-state arbitration in favor of a bilateral investment court 
that is explicitly intended to lay the basis for a future multilateral investment 
court that would resolve disputes between EU member nations and their trading 
parties.213 The Canada-EU investment court would be a permanent body with 
judges appointed and paid for by the two countries, operating under 
UNCITRAL transparency rules.214 It remains to be seen whether the new 
                                                                                                                                 
examples of what Puig terms regional trade agreements (RTAS), different from agreements 
negotiated by the World Trade Organization in its exclusive application to a relatively small 
number of countries. Puig has termed the emergence of RTAs “mini-lateralism.” RTAs 
complicate an already complicated international dispute resolution framework providing na-
tions with strategic opportunities to re-litigate issues under a different treaty’s provisions 
when they have failed to prevail under another treaty’s dispute resolution clause. See Puig, 
supra note165, at 3; see also Patrick Gillespie, NAFTA: What It Is and Why Trump Hates It, 
CNN: CNN MONEY (Nov. 15, 2016, 5:17 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/15/news/eco 
nomy/trump-what-is-nafta/index.html [https://perma.cc/7NUA-84K5] (stating that the 
North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed into law by the U.S. in 1994, is an 
example of a regional trade agreement that the U.S. ratified.  
210  See Tonda Maccharles, Agreeing on How to Disagree Is One of the Biggest NAFTA De-
bates, STAR.COM, (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/08/16/agreei 
ng-on-how-to-disagree-is-one-of-the-biggest-nafta-debates.html [https://perma.cc/4QYD-EJ 
72]. See also Ioannis Glinavos, The Big Challenge of the NAFTA Negotiations: Dispute Set-
tlement, CONVERSATION (Aug. 14, 2017, 6:56 AM) https://theconversation.com/the-big-
challenge-of-the-nafta-renegotiations-dispute-settlement-82394 [https://perma.cc/MZ75-FD 
YE]. 
211  Among these (in addition to Australia) are Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, 
South Africa, South Korea, and Venezuela. Brazil is reported to have steadily declined to 
negotiate treaties with investor-state arbitration clauses. Soltysinski, supra note 205, at 324; 
The Arbitration Game, supra note 203. 
212  See IIA ISSUES NOTE, supra note 182, at 9 (presenting examples of recent substantive 
reforms that include specifying criteria arbitrators should consider when deciding whether a 
country’s decision qualifies as an “indirect expropriation” (i.e. akin to Philip Morris’ claim 
regarding Australia’s plain packaging law) and identifying “public policy exceptions” that 
exclude certain national decisions from review by arbitrators). 
213  A Future Multilateral Investment Court, EUR. COMMISSION (Dec. 13, 2016), http://europa 
.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4350_en.htm [https://perma.cc/4BZ5-XNH5]. 
214  Each country will appoint five members, and an additional five “neutrals” will be chosen 
collaboratively. All will serve for initial terms of five years, renewable for another five 
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CETA investment court system will survive scrutiny by the European Court of 
Justice and be deemed compatible with EU laws.215 However, the EU parlia-
ment is pushing forward with consultation on establishing a multi-lateral in-
vestment court, drawing in part on the CETA model and in part on agreements 
recently negotiated between the EU and Vietnam and the EU and Singapore.216 
The issues highlighted in current analyses and debate are appointment and re-
muneration of adjudicators, transparency of process and outcomes, costs and 
cost allocation, remedies, and appellate rights.217 
IV. RE-INVENTING ARBITRATION 
For many years, domestic arbitration in the United States, international 
commercial arbitration, and investor-state arbitration have evolved on parallel 
but separate tracks, each responding to different political, economic, and social 
circumstances. Their evolution, however, has had (at least) two features in 
common:  
(1)  an expansion in substantive scope, from a relatively narrow and homoge-
neous set of private nature disputes, to a more broad and diverse set of dis-
putes with significant public policy implications; and  
(2)  in response, the transformation of the procedure itself from an informal, 
streamlined, and highly private process, to a process resembling a public 
adjudicative forum, with formal rules, time consuming (and increasingly 
expensive) due process protections, precedential decision-making, and—at 
least in certain instances—public access to process and outcomes.  
                                                                                                                                 
years. The judges may not serve as private arbitrators, party experts, or legal counsel in any 
investment dispute during their term on the court. A panel of three will be chosen from this 
bench at random to hear each dispute. Parties may appeal the awards to a separate appeal 
tribunal for legal error or manifest errors of fact. The details of the tribunal selection are yet 
to be decided. The final awards will be enforceable in the courts of Canada and EU member 
states. However, enforceability elsewhere is uncertain as the “court” arguably is not covered 
by the New York Convention. Mark Mangan, Commentary, The EU Succeeds in Establish-
ing a Permanent Investment Court in Its Trade Treaties with Canada and Vietnam, 
MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., May 2016, at 2–4; see also Hogan Lovells, CETA Paves the Way 
for Investment Court System, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/de 
tail.aspx?g=cddc2b70-9425-418f-bcf1-512cb8483100 [https://perma.cc/N82G-VZ9V] (ex-
plaining, moreover, that the viability of the Court itself is in question: Belgium has chal-
lenged it on the basis of inconsistency with EU law). 
215  EU Court to Judge Controversial Investment Rules in Canada Trade Deal, CLIENTEARTH 
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.clientearth.org/eu-court-to-judge-controversial-investment-rules 
-in-canada-trade-deal/Nonet [https://perma.cc/P7XX-GMEL]. 
216  See STEFFEN HINDELANG & TEOMAN M. HAGEMEYER, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S COMM. 
ON INT’L TRADE, IN PURSUIT OF AN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT COURT: RECENTLY 
NEGOTIATED INVESTMENT CHAPTERS IN EU COMPREHENSIVE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD 
/2017/603844/EXPO_STU(2017)603844_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/LN2Z-MR67]. 
217  Id. at 15–21. 
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The result has been a new form of dispute resolution that is neither fully 
private nor fully public, eschewing, in an increasing variety of circumstances, 
the advantages that arbitration’s early business person proponents hoped to 
achieve by substituting arbitration for court dispute resolution, without guaran-
teeing in these or other circumstances the protections public adjudication can 
offer for less powerful disputants and the public interest.  
There is no evidence that this transformation of domestic and international 
commercial arbitration was intended by the justices who built the doctrinal edi-
fice that supports arbitration in the United States today.218 Indeed, it is uncer-
tain whether these justices understand how far arbitration in the commercial 
arena has strayed from the vision of quick and inexpensive dispute resolution 
that the Court has long cited as the basis for a public policy favoring arbitra-
tion.219 Nor is it clear that international treaty negotiators understood, until re-
cently, the growing public antipathy to using private arbitral processes to re-
solve conflicts between multinational corporate investors and democratically-
elected and appointed public officials and the threat that this antipathy poses to 
international trade and investment treaty-making in the future.220 
A.  Domestic Arbitration in the United States 
As commercial arbitration has become more formal, procedurally complex, 
time-consuming, and expensive, the commercial dispute resolution market has 
                                                        
218  See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“over the past decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining 
congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by 
case, an edifice of its own creation.”); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 
U.S. 333, 348 (2011) (“the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the principal 
advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process slower, more costly, and 
more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”). 
219  See e.g. AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 344–45 (“The point of affording parties discretion in 
designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to 
the type of dispute . . . the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the 
cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.” (internal citations omitted)). See also 
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(“The effective-vindication rule has thus operated year in and year out without undermining, 
much less “destroy[ing],” the prospect of speedy dispute resolution that arbitration se-
cures.”). 
220  Although discussions leading up to the formal launch of negotiations of the TTIP began 
in 2011, opposition to the proposed dispute resolution provisions does not seem to have at-
tracted high level government attention until 2015. See Vicki L. Birchfield, Negotiating the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Comparing U.S. and EU Motivations, Op-
positions and Public Opinion 1 (Ga. Tech Ctr for European and Transatlantic Studies, Work-
ing Paper No. GTJMCE-2015-2, 2015). Hensler attended a session of the U.K. Law Socie-
ty’s February 2015 “Global Law Summit” at which a speaker described trade negotiators as 
surprised that the investor-state dispute settlement clause in the proposed TTIP proved to be 
a significant stumbling-block in securing support for the treaty; seasoned trade negotiators, 
he said, were focused on the substantive aspects of the proposed agreement. 
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shifted towards mediation,221 and some industries that once were pillars of the 
arbitration market now advise their members to consider using other dispute 
resolution methods before adopting arbitration.222 Many business decision-
makers, however, continue to choose arbitration for their business-to-business 
disputes, notwithstanding their complaints about costs and delay. By inference, 
these decision-makers increasingly choose arbitration for their wholly domestic 
disputes not because they perceive it to be quick or inexpensive but rather—
despite the transaction costs—because it allows them to resolve their differ-
ences in private, with no public record. Whether “public policy” should support 
such a choice is worthy of more public debate than has been accorded to the 
question to date. 
The principle that transacting parties should both be permitted to voluntari-
ly agree to an extrajudicial dispute resolution process and, having once chosen 
such, held to such agreements is key to U.S. courts’ arbitration jurisprudence. 
However, in extending enforcement of arbitration agreements to employment 
and consumer contracts of adhesion that require arbitration, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has honored the principle in word only. To protect their integrity (and to 
their credit) leading arbitration providers have created “due process protocols” 
that extend some of the protections of public adjudication to employees and 
consumers and attempt to create a more level playing field between the latter 
and the more powerful institutions that employ them and sell them products and 
services.223 The success of such protocols in protecting employees and con-
sumers is far from clear, and available evidence suggests that consumers have 
little understanding of the differences between arbitration—whatever its 
form—and litigation.224 Moreover, as a result of confidentiality provisions, em-
ployment and consumer arbitration continue to offer powerful individuals and 
corporations the ability to hide egregious behavior from public view.225 
Having endorsed the use of arbitration in the employment and consumer 
domain, the U.S. Supreme Court opened a door to corporations wishing to use 
arbitration as a means of denying their employees and customers collective 
                                                        
221  Deborah R. Hensler, The Private in Public, The Public in Private: The Blurring Bounda-
ry Between Public and Private Dispute Resolution, in FORMALISATION AND FLEXIBILISATION 
IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 45, (Joachim Zekoll et al. eds., 2014) (discussing the emergence of 
mediation as a preferred dispute resolution procedure for business disputants). 
222  See generally BRUNER & O’CONNOR supra note 101. 
223  See discussion supra Sections I.C.2–3. 
224  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT 
TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) 11 
(2015). 
225  Recent revelations of allegations of sexual harassment of employees have provoked ques-
tioning of the appropriateness of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements, at least as 
pertain to these sorts of charges. See Gretchen Carlson, How to Encourage More Women to 
Report Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/1 
0/opinion/women-reporting-sexual-harassment.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7QU2-P5YS]. 
However, the prevalence of confidential settlement agreements in litigated cases dilutes the 
power of this critique. 
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pursuit of remedies for collective harm. Ironically, defendants’ efforts to pre-
clude class actions by imposing arbitration on employees and consumers 
brought the differences between public courts and private arbitration into 
sharper focus for some justices than evinced in the Court’s prior decisions on 
arbitration.226 Forced to consider the differences in capacity to manage collec-
tive claiming between courts and private arbitration providers, the U.S. Su-
preme Court concluded that it would be a mistake to grant the latter the authori-
ty granted to federal and state judges to determine when it is appropriate to 
permit claimants to proceed in class form and to protect class members against 
the agency costs inherent in representative collective proceedings. Rather than 
concluding that collective legal claims properly belong in public courts, how-
ever, the Court acceded to corporations’ desires to deny such claims altogeth-
er.227  
It would be quixotic to propose that the U.S. Supreme Court reverse the 
past several decades of its arbitration jurisprudence.228 Its decisions, however, 
rest on statutory interpretation. The U.S. Congress could reverse the Court’s 
policies with regard to employment and consumer arbitration with new legisla-
tion. By returning domestic commercial arbitration to the purely commercial 
sphere, Congress could  re-define the boundary between private arbitration and 
public adjudication and preserve each for its most appropriate uses. While it is 
wildly wishful thinking to expect such action in the near future, as we have 
seen recently, elections can bring sharp shifts in legislative decision-making.  
B. International Commercial Arbitration 
Although international commercial arbitration has been subject to the same 
complexification as domestic commercial arbitration, absent an international 
convention on the enforcement of judgments or an international commercial 
court, arbitration remains the best available option for trans-national business 
disputes. The proliferation of international commercial arbitration tribunals of-
fers a potential for innovative dispute system design and the possibility that 
market competition will result over time in the emergence of optimal proce-
dures. Increased transparency with regard to process and outcomes would ena-
ble such competition, which might in turn lead to a greater appetite for trans-
parency among entrepreneurial arbitration providers eager to prove their 
superiority to others. 
The increasingly globalized business environment will likely produce an 
increasing number of trans-national disputes requiring an international com-
                                                        
226  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348–51 (2011). 
227  Id. 
228  Just ten years after Southland, Justice O’Connor felt compelled to concur in the decision 
in Allied-Bruce Terminix on the grounds of stare decisis, notwithstanding dissenters’ argu-
ment that a wrongly-determined case should not be accorded such deference. Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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mercial arbitration forum, which may in turn lead to growth in the number of 
expert arbitrators and perhaps in their diversity as well. While in the domestic 
sphere, there is room for robust debate about the appropriateness of substituting 
private dispute resolution for public adjudication and an argument for preserv-
ing the distinctiveness of each, in the international commercial arbitration are-
na, there is currently no obvious alternative to private dispute resolution. As a 
result, what is needed in the international commercial arbitration domain is in-
dependent debate about procedural design, empirical analysis to support that 
debate, and objective consideration of the benefits and limitations of arbitral 
decision-making. Unfortunately, the fact that those with the most expertise in 
international commercial arbitration may stand to lose financially as a result of 
changes in current rules and practices poses an obstacle to such consideration. 
C. Investor-State Arbitration 
The situation with regard to investor-state arbitration is more vexed than 
the situation of traditional international commercial arbitration. As with inter-
national commercial arbitration, there is currently no obvious alternative to ar-
bitration. The issues presented in investor-state arbitration, however, are more 
likely to have direct consequences for the public than the issues in ordinary in-
ternational commercial arbitration. Moreover, its historical provenance is much 
more recent; although investor-state arbitration dates back to the 1960s, the 
dramatic increase in investor-state disputes occurred much more recently. As a 
result, investor-state arbitration is arguably less entrenched than international 
commercial arbitration and more amenable to regime change. 
Proposals to establish an international investment court offer promise of 
protecting important public values in disputes that implicate important national 
interests, such as public health, environmental protection, and product safety. In 
particular, proposals to establish a public process for appointing judges to de-
cide investor-state disputes and to pay these judges and subsidize court opera-
tions from public funds, address concerns about bias in investor-state arbitra-
tion. Heightened transparency standards (by comparison with ISID and 
UNCITRAL rules) would provide objective evidence of the consequences of 
the new court’s decision-making, as well as offer the possibility for third-
parties to observe and participate in hearings. 
A few bi-lateral investment treaties have already substituted an investment 
court paradigm for traditional investor-state arbitration in their dispute settle-
ment clauses. Extending the concept to multi-lateral treaties will be challeng-
ing, but there appears to be agreement in the EU that working towards this goal 
is desirable. If international investment courts were to proliferate through the 
re-negotiation of BITS, pressure might mount for even those countries, such as 
the United States, which have traditionally been hostile to the idea of interna-
tional courts, to substitute a more publicly-oriented court paradigm for tradi-
tional investor state arbitration in its bi-lateral trade agreements. Ultimately, an 
18 NEV. L.J. 381, HENSLER KHATAM - FINAL 3/27/18  2:33 PM 
Winter 2018] RE-INVENTING ARBITRATION 425 
international investment court also could provide an attractive alternative to ar-








































18 NEV. L.J. 381, HENSLER KHATAM - FINAL 3/27/18  2:33 PM 










[PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] 
